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LIST OF ALL PARTIES IN THE DISTRICT COURT 
The following parties and attorneys appeared in the proceeding in the District Court: 
1. PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc.,1 a Utah corporation, Plaintiff7Appellee, 
represented by Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, Anderson & Olsen, Logan, Utah. 
2. R. Lowell Huber, Defendant/Appellant and Third-Party Plaintiff, represented 
by Joseph M. Chambers of Preston & Chambers, Logan, Utah. 
3. As to PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc. and R. Lowell Huber, this is a multiple 
claim case. A July 3,1995 judgment was entered in this case ordering specific performance 
of a contract for the purchase of real property between PDQ Lube Center, Inc. as buyer and 
R. Lowell Huber as seller. The July 3,1995 judgment is the subject of this appeal currently 
pending before this Court, Case No. 950752-CA. Subsequent to this appeal being taken, 
Huber complied with the trial court's order requiring him to remove certain underground 
petroleum storage tanks and obtain environmental clearance for the property from the State. 
Pursuant to the court's July 3, 1995 order, PDQ then was given 84 days to perform their 
obligation to obtain financing and purchase the property. The trial court later held that 
PDQ failed to timely perform their contractual obligations of tendering the purchase price 
and on February 15, 1996 entered an order terminating Huber's obligation to convey. The 
Plaintiff, PDQ, appealed that order which is the subject of a separate appeal pending before 
this court as Case No. 960617-CA. Though arising from the same original transaction, the 
Suit was initiated under PDQ Lube Center, Inc.; however, PDQ Lube Center, 
Inc. was involuntarily suspended April 16, 1993. Prior to trial they attempted 
to reinstate but could not under the name PDQ Lube Center, Inc. as that name was 
no longer available. They were able to reinstate on January 17, 1995 (less than 
a month before trial) under the name PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc., which is 
their true name at this time. See Finding of Fact #15. 
i 
February 15, 1996 order terminating the contract and the judgment of July 3, 1995, from 
which this appeal is taken, involve separate issues. 
4. As to Third-Party Defendants, this is a multiple party and multiple claim case. 
The multiple party and claim aspects of the case involving the Third-Party Defendants are 
not before the Court on appeal. The Third-Party Defendants were brought into the suit by 
R. Lowell Huber, Third-Party Plaintiff, relative to the liability of various "owners" and 
"operators" of the property in question under the Underground Storage Tank Act, Utah 
Code Ann., Title 19, Chapter 6, and under a prior property sale contract. The third-party 
action is still pending in District Court. The claims in the third-party action do not in any 
way appear to involve the claims on appeal. 
ii 
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BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 950752-CA 
First District, 
Logan Dept., 
Div. I, #94 038 
JURISDICTION 
The Utah Supreme Court has original jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78-2-
2(3)(j) U.C A, aiuJ Rules } ami -1 I Mali R App I1 I'liis matin was iransteniMl to tlic ( ooit 
of Appeals pursuant to §78-2-2(4) and §78-2a-3(2)(j) U.CA. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
1. Issue: In interpreting the Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) executed 
by the parties did the trial court commit error when it determined that the seller's obligation 
to remove the underground storage tanks (and obtain environmental clearance) was a 
condition precedent rather than a concurrent condition to the buyer's obligations to obtain 
financing, to tender the purchase funds, etc. 
Standard of Review: The interpretation of a contract is a question of law. Provo 
Citv Corp. v. Nielson Scott Co., Inc.. 603 P.2d 803, 805 (Utah 1979); Howe v. Professional 
Manivest Inc., 829 P.2d 160 (Utah App. 1992). Trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed 
for correctness, affording no deference. Reliance Ins. Co. v. Utah Dept. of Transp., 858 
P.2d 1363 (Utah 1993); Ong Int'l. (USA^ v. 11th Ave. Corp.. 850 P.2d 447,452 (Utah 1993). 
The interpretation of an "unambiguous, integrated contract is a question of law, which 
is reviewed on appeal for correctness.11 Howe v. Professional Manivest. Inc.. supra; Crowther 
v. Carter. 767 P.2d 129, 131 (Utah App. 1989). See also Trolley Square Associates v. 
Nielson. 886 P.2d 61, 63 (Utah App. 1994). 
The initial question of whether [a contract] is ambiguous is a question of law, to be 
reviewed for correctness. Wade v. StangL 869 P.2d 9, 12 (Utah App. 1994); Home Sav. & 
Loan v. Aetna Casualty & Sur. Co.. 817 P.2d 341, 347 (Utah App. 1991). If a contract is 
ambiguous, it will be construed against the drafter only if extrinsic evidence fails to clarify 
the intent of the parties. Willburn v. Interstate Elec. 748 P.2d 582, 585 (Utah App. 1988), 
cert, granted, 765 P.2d 1277 (Utah 1988), cert, dismissed, 774 P.2d 1149 (Utah 1989). The 
findings of the trial court regarding the intent of the parties, determined by extrinsic 
evidence, will be overturned only if clearly erroneous. Allstate Enter. Inc. v. Hertford. 772 
P.2d 466, 468 (Utah App. 1989). But see Reed v. Alvev. 610 P.2d 1374 (Utah 1980). 
Specific performance is an equitable remedy authorizing broad scope of review 
encompassing both questions of law and questions of fact. 
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Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: See Defendants Trial Memorandum 
Docket # N; Objections to I'lndinys Docket #Q'l and Objection to Entry of Judgment and 
Order Docket #92, 96, 97 and 98. 
l.B. Issue: Did the trial court ni us <t nuiki >l Liw niii ontenng specific 
performance of the contract where the contract itself failed to expressly provide for a 
specific sequence for the parties respective performances to occur? 
Standard of Review: Because specific performance is an equitable remedy, authority 
exists for a broader scope of review than simply the standard "review for correctness." 
Wink' wc IiiHf recognized the trial coiiil'*' advantageous position in relation to 
questions of fact, Pagono v. Walker. Utah, 539 P.2d 452, 454 (1975), when the trial court 
has based its rulings upon a misunderstanding and misapplication of the law, where a correct 
one would have produced a different result, the party adversely affected is entitled to have 
the error rectified in a proper adjudication under correct principles of law. Reed v. Alvey. 
610 P 2d 1374, 1377 (Utah 1980). 
In cases of equity this Court is authorized to exercise a broad scope of review 
encompassing both questions of law and questions of fact. The Utah 
Constitution, Article VIII, Section 9, which provides:"... in equity cases the 
appeal may be on questions of both law and fact." [Article VIII, Section 9 has 
since been amended.] 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved Sec DelciidaiK's ll'iinl Memorandum 
Docket #79; Objections to Findings Docket #92 and Objection to Entry of Judgment and 
Order Docket #92, 96, 97 and 98. 
2. When the REPC expressly provided "time is of the essence" did the trial court 
err as a matter of law in ordering specific performance when the buyer failed to tender its 
3 
performance tender (the purchase funds, etc.) strictly in the time frame required by the real 
estate purchase contract? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch.. 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). See also authorities cited 
above. 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: See Defendant's trial memorandum 
Docket #79; objections Docket #92, 96, 97 and 98. 
3. Where a contract obligates both the buyer and seller to perform certain acts, 
but the contract does not specifically state which performance is to occur first, can a party 
(Seller), as a matter of law, be acting in bad faith if it waits for the other party (Buyer) to 
perform, particularly where the contract expressly provides a window to terminate his 
contractual obligation (to sell) if the other party (Buyer) failed to perform a condition to the 
contract (to obtain financing) by a specific date? 
Standard of Review: The trial court's legal conclusions are reviewed for correctness. 
Crookston v. Fire Ins. Exch., 860 P.2d 937, 938 (Utah 1993). See also authorities cited 
above. 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Defendant's trial memorandum Docket 
#79 and objections Docket #92, 96, 97,and 98. 
4. Did the trial court err in failing to grant the Defendant's Motion in Limine 
when it allowed parole evidence over the Defendant's continuing objection? 
Standard of Review: "When reviewing a trial court's ruling regarding the admissibility 
of evidence under Rule 403, 'we will not overturn the court's determination unless it was an 
4 
"abuse of discretion."1 State v. Lindgreen. 910 P.2d 1271 (Utah App. 1996) quoting State v. 
White, 880 P.2d 18, 20 (Utah App. 1994). 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Motion in Limine Docket #73, 
memorandum in support of Motion in Limine Docket #74. 
5. Did the trial court err as a matter of law in failing to enforce the statutory 
mandate of §42-2-10 U.C.A? 
Standard of Review: The proper construction of a statute is a question of law. 
"Accordingly, we grant no particular deference to the District Courts rulings but review 
them for correctness." Nixon v. Salt Lake Citv Corp.. 898 P.2d 265, 268 (Utah 1995). 
Citation to Record Where Issue Preserved: Defendant's motion to dismiss Docket 
#62, 63, 64 and 75, transcript p. 7 lines 6-10 (Vol. 1). 
APPLICABLE STATUTES AND RULES 
Utah Code Ann. § 42-2-10: 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an assumed 
name without having complied with the provisions of this chapter, and until 
the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state; and 
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late filing fee 
determined by the division director in an amount not to exceed three 
times the fees charged under Section 42-2-7 and established under 
Subsection 63-38-3(2). 
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STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case. The Defendant R. Lowell Huber (hereinafter "Huber") 
appealed from the July 3,1995 order interpreting his obligation under a contract to remove 
certain underground petroleum storage tanks to be a condition precedent rather than a 
condition concurrent to the buyer's obligation to obtain financing and tender of the purchase 
price and a $4,000 non-refundable deposit. The trial court ordered specific performance of 
the real estate contract and awarded attorney fees against the Defendant. 
B. Course of Proceedings and Disposition in the Court Below. 
1. On September 17, 1993, PDQ Lube Center, Inc. (hereinafter "PDQ" or 
Buyer) made an offer to R. Lowell Huber ("Huber") through a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract (REPC) and Addendum to purchase property located at 300 North Main Street 
in Logan, Utah. On September 20, 1993, R. Lowell Huber (hereinafter "Huber" or Seller) 
accepted PDQ's offer. R. at 6-9. Trial Exhibit #1, Addendum 1. 
2. On March 14,1994, PDQ Lube Center, Inc. filed its Complaint seeking 
specific performance of Huber's obligations under the Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Addendum. R. at 1-9. 
3. In late December 1994, prior to trial Huber filed a motion to dismiss 
the action in light of PDQ!s failure to comply with §42-2-10 U.C.A. which the court denied. 
Docket # 62, 63, 64 and 75. 
4. Immediately prior to trial Huber filed a Motion in Limine seeking to 
exclude all parole evidence based upon paragraph 14 of the contract. Docket # 74. 
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5. After four days of trial held on February 8, 9,10 and 16,1995, the trial 
court ruled in favor of PDQ and made findings from the bench. PDQ's attorney was 
requested to prepare the formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law. The proposed 
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law were the subject of a later proceeding before the 
trial court and which are part of the record. Docket # 79, 92, 96, and 97. 
6. The formal Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law and Judgment and 
Decree were entered by the court on July 3, 1995. A complete copy of the Findings/ 
Conclusions is included in the Addendum. 
7. On August 1, 1995, Huber appealed the trial court's July 3, 1995 
judgment. The judgment ordered Huber to remove the underground storage tanks and sell 
the property if PDQ tendered the purchase price within 84 days of receiving notice of 
environmental clearance. This appeal (No. 950752-CA) involves the trial and order entered 
July 3, 1995. 
Other matters involved in Case No. 960617-CA: 
8. After trial but before the judgment was formally entered Huber began 
removing the underground storage tanks in order to comply with the court's bench ruling. 
9. On September 7, 1995, PDQ received a letter from the State of Utah 
that the environmental cleanup requirements of the state had been satisfied. R. at 699. 
10. On November 28,1995, PDQ delivered a letter of attempted tender to 
R. Lowell Huber. R. at 736. 
11. Also on November 28,1995, but before all the funds were delivered to 
the closing agent, Huber delivered to PDQ Lube Center, Inc. a letter making demand on 
7 
the closing agent and a letter to PDQ's attorney rejecting PDQ's tender by writing rather 
than by performance. R. at 737-738. 
12. On December 12, 1995, Huber filed a Motion for Order Terminating 
Contract with the District Court. R. at 655-656. 
13. On December 14, 1995, PDQ filed a Motion for Order Compelling 
Compliance with Contract Terms and Conveying Property. R. at 674-675. 
14. On December 21,1995, a hearing was held at which PDQ's and Huber's 
attorneys argued the two foregoing motions. Transcript of Hearing Proceedings, December 
21, 1995. 
15. On December 22,1995, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision 
ruling that PDQ "failed to make a proper tender of payment" and granted Huber's Motion 
for Order Terminating Contract. R. at 687-688. 
16. On January 8, 1996, PDQ filed a Motion for a New Trial or 
Amendment of Judgment and Request for Evidentiary Hearing to Take Additional 
Testimony. R. at 695-697. 
17. On February 3,1996, the trial court issued its Memorandum Decision 
again ruling that PDQ "failed to make a proper tender" and denied PDQ's Motion for a new 
Trial or Amendment of Judgment and Request for Evidentiary Hearing to Take Additional 
Testimony. 
18. On February 15, 1996, the trial court filed the Order Terminating 
Defendant Huber's Obligation to Convey. R. at 805-808. 
8 
19. On May 1,1996, the trial court filed its Order Certifying Matter under 
Rule 54(b) U.R.C.P. R. at 898-899. 
20. On May 30, 1996, PDQ Lube Center, Inc., filed its Notice of Appeal. 
The appeal is fully briefed and currently pending before this court, Case No. 960617-CA. 
C. Statement of Facts. Since the appeal primarily seeks a review of the trial 
courtfs legal conclusions, the Appellant Huber essentially adopts as the Statement of Facts 
the trial court's Findings of Facts and Conclusions of Law as supplemented by specific 
reference to the proceedings as necessary to put the issues raised in this appeal in context. 
(Note: The trial court's findings are set out verbatim and the Appellant's supplemental 
references or comments are in italics.) 
1. On September 17,1993, PDQ Lube Center tendered to Lowell Huber 
a Real Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) and Addendum offering to purchase the property 
located at North Main Street in Logan, Utah. The REPC is the approved standard form 
adopted by the Utah Real Estate Commission and the Office of the Utah Attorney General, 
June 1993. It has since been revised and modified The offer to purchase was made through 
a licensed real estate agent Marty Spicer who failed to disclose to Huber he was acting as both 
the seller and the buyer's agent. Tr. p. 166 L7-16. See paragraph 5 Exhibit 1 (Addendum 1). 
Because this dispute involves the interpretation of the REPC (Exhibit 1) the Appellant would 
request the Court to turn to Exhibit 1 and carefully review each party's respective contractual 
obligations before proceeding further. Particular attention should be given to the parties' 
obligations under paragraphs 2.1, 2.2., 2.3, 3.8, 8.1, 8.2, 8.3, 8.4, 9, 14, 21, 24, and the special 
considerations contained in the Addendum No. 1 to the REPC. 
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2. Lowell Huber accepted PDQ Lube Center's offer to purchase the 
property by signing the Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum on September 22, 
1993. A copy of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum was received by the 
Court as Exhibit "1." It is also set out in its entirety as Addendum 1. 
3. On September 23, 1993, the status of the property on the multiple 
listing service was changed to show that the property was under contract to PDQ Lube 
Center. 
4. Within a week of when the parties entered into the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and Addendum, PDQ Lube Center sought new financing by meeting with 
the Certified Development Company in Salt Lake City with regards to an SBA loan and was 
given a checklist of items to complete including the fact that they would need to contact an 
SBA loan sponsor, and consequently met with Joel Rush, a banker with the Bank of Utah. 
PDQ Lube Center met with Logan City representatives relative to building site and 
construction permits (a building permit was not formally approved). PDQ Lube Center 
obtained site approval from Pennzoil Products. During that same time frame and 
supplemented over four weeks, PDQ Lube Center provided the Bank of Utah with a folder 
on the property, received by the Court as Exhibit "2," which included information about the 
demographics, the Pennzoil products and equipment, the building plan, ten-year projections, 
a three-year track record, balance sheet, tax returns of PDQ Lube Center in Ogden, Craig 
Hansen's 1993 personal financial statement, comparables on the property, and a bid for 
construction on the building. 
10 
However, no formal loan application was ever made even though the contract 
required PDQ to make formal application within five (5) days of acceptance by Huber. See 
paragraph 2.1 REPC; testimony of Joel Rush TR 48-71 (particularly 48, 66-67, 71) Martin 
Collins TR 93-95; Craig Hansen 329-337 and 371-381; Proffer of counsel see TR 10/19-21. (See 
Addendums 3-6.) 
5. No appraisal of the property was ever obtained by PDQ Lube Center 
or the bank working with PDQ Lube Center to obtain the SBA loan. Though there was 
evidence that a loan (sic - appraisal?) could have been performed prior to removal of the 
tanks and proof of no contamination, there was also evidence that until the tanks were 
removed and proof of no contamination shown, an appraisal would have had little value. 
However, this was never communicated to Huber. TR128 As stated above,in 
Finding 5 the testimony of Jack Draxler (an appraiser) was that an appraisal could have been 
performed prior to the tank removal It would have been subject to the environmental clearance 
being obtained Testimony of Jack Draxler. TR 438-444. The appraisal was not obtained 
because Joel Rush, the buyer's banker, felt it would be too expensive to obtain the appraisal at 
that time and the buyer did not order one. Testimony of Joel Rush, Addendum 4. TR 48-71; 
TR 329-337. See also testimony Craig Hansen 329-337 and 371-381. In any event, PDQ could 
not have obtained the loan until their suspended status was corrected and they were reinstated 
Joel Rush TR 76. Their status as PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc. was not reinstated until 
January 17, 1995, prior to trial See Finding 15 below. 
6. On September 22, 1993, Lowell Huber had permits to remove the 
underground tanks from the property. He had obtained a bid from Whitaker Construction 
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Company one year prior for removal of the tanks. He was licensed as a tank remover and 
was doing business as Cache Valley Tank Removers and Soil Samplers and had previously 
removed a tank in a land sale in which Martin Spicer, the real estate agent in this case, was 
involved. At the time the contract was created, the parties all were aware that Lowell Huber 
had an issued permit for removal of the tanks. The parties understood and believed that 
the tanks would be removed during the time frame authorized by that permit. Martin Spicer 
testified, and the Court believes, that Lowell Huber said he would move immediately upon 
signing of the contract to remove the tanks. He had a site permit. He was a licensed 
remover. He had his own backhoe and could expedite removal very quickly. Because of the 
weather and other things, he represented he could proceed within perhaps a 30-day time 
frame from the date the parties entered into the Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Addendum. Could and would are not the same thing. There is no dispute Huber "could 
proceed" to remove the tanks within 30 days. However, there was no written or oral 
representation he would remove the tanks before financing was assured See paragraph 14 of 
contract. See also TR 173-176. 
7. Martin Spicer had numerous discussions with Lowell Huber as to why 
the tanks were not removed. Lowell Huber wanted to negotiate with Bowens for their 
participation in the removal costs. (Bowens were predecessors in interest in the property 
at issue in this case.) When the Bowens refused to participate in the removal costs, Huber 
said he wanted to kill the deal. Paragraph 2.3 of the contract specifically allowed a three day 
window to terminate the contract. Had Huber been cognizant of this specific provision and its 
application he could have simply exercised his right to terminate at this time. 
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No one (Spicer, PDQ, or PDQs banker) ever notified Huber that the tanks had 
to be removed to obtain an appraisal and PDQ never demanded that it be done. Huber in turn 
was waiting for the loan approval before he effectively shut down his business to remove the 
tanks. 
8. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum provided that PDQ 
Lube Center provide a $4,000.00 non-refundable cleanup deposit. On November 12, 1993, 
PDQ Lube Center sent the $4,000.00 deposit to Martin Spicer upon the request of Mr. 
Spicer. 
The $4,000 negotiated to offset Huberts out of pocket costs to remove the tanks 
was not sent until November 12, 1993 and not received by Spicer until around November 15, 
1993. IfPDQ was in such a dire need of the appraisal for financing, why did they wait so long 
until they sent these funds? 
9. On or about the 15th of November, 1993, Martin Spicer met with 
Lowell Huber and showed him the $4,000.00 PDQ Lube Center deposit and discussed with 
Huber not only the deposit but also the unwillingness of the Bowens to participate in the 
costs of removal. 
10. On or about November 15, 1993, and at later times, Martin Spicer 
offered to advance funds to Lowell Huber in order that Lowell Huber would have sufficient 
funds to remove the tanks. 
11. During the period of time from November 15, 1993, until September 
15, 1994, Martin Spicer held the $4,000.00 check in an envelope unopened and did not 
attempt to deposit the check into his broker's trust account. On September 15, 1994, 
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following the deposition of Mr. Spicer, Mr. Spicer allowed the check to be opened during 
his deposition and following the deposition deposited the check into his broker's real estate 
trust account, where the deposit sits presently. 
Spice?s handling of the funds in this manner is legally improper. They should 
have been deposited into his broker's trust account within three days. Utah Admin. Code R162-
4-2 (trust accounts). 
12. Lowell Huber has yet to provide PDQ Lube Center with a State of 
Utah Bear River Health Department Environmental Clearance and remove any 
unacceptable contamination at Huber's expense. 
(Finding 12 made at trial - Huber has subsequently removed the tanks and 
provided the necessary environmental clearance (See Case No. 960617-CA) as ordered by the 
court.) 
13. Lowell Huber has at no time objected to PDQ Lube Center's attempts 
to obtain a loan under the terms of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum, 
PDQ Lube Center is deemed qualified. 
Conversely, as noted above, PDQ at no time objected to Huber waiting for 
financing to be approved before removing the tanks. TR 128 
14. PDQ Lube Center's attorney's fees and costs incurred through February 
9,1995, total $9,187.50. Said fees and costs are reasonable, consistent with those generally 
charged in this community both as to hourly charge and time spent, and are reasonably 
reflective of attorney fees and costs incurred in this kind of case and in light of the result 
reached in this case. 
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15. Though PDQ Lube Center was involuntarily suspended effective April 
16, 1993, for failure to file its annual report, PDQ Lube Center was reinstated on January 
17, 1995, under the name of PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc. 
PDQ Lube Service Center Inc* not PDQ Lube Center. Docket #62, 63, 64, 69; 
TR 369. 
16. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, the Court finds 
that there is not just reason for delay in entering judgment on PDQ Lube Center's claims 
against Lowell Huber. 
There are third party claims pending in the trial court below regarding 
environmental and tank removal costs. 
Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Trial Court entered the following 
Conclusions of Law: 
1. PDQ Lube Center and Lowell Huber entered into a valid contract for the sale 
of the subject property. 
2. The contract provided that time was of the essence. 
3. PDQ Lube Center made all reasonable efforts to comply in good faith with 
its obligations under the contract, including its providing the $4,000.00 nonrefundable 
cleanup deposit. 
4. Lowell Huber failed to make a good faith effort to remove the tanks. On the 
contrary, when Lowell Huber could not obtain contributions from a third party, Lowell 
Huber engaged in bad faith conduct in an attempt to kill the deal. 
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5. Any failure of PDQ Lube Center to perform under the contract was directly 
related to or caused by Lowell Huber!s bad faith and failure to perform. 
6. PDQ Lube Center should be awarded an order of specific performance from 
this Court directing Lowell Huber to comply with the contract by: 
(a) providing PDQ Lube Center with a state and local environment 
clearance certificate for the site; and 
(b) both parties are ordered to comply with the contract terms. 
An order should be entered requiring Lowell Huber to convey the property 
to PDQ Lube Center if PDQ Lube Center is able to tender the full purchase price within 
84 days following the proof to PDQ Lube Center of environmental clearance for the site. 
The original contract was 84 days from signing until closing. The time frame now may be 
longer because Lowell Huber will now have to obtain a new removal permit and the Court 
doesn't have any information on how long that will take. Originally, there was an existing 
permit. That permit has expired. Consequently, the Court is selecting that 84-day figure 
or term and saying that will commence on the date the certificate is provided showing that 
the site is environmentally clean. 
7. Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Real Estate Purchase Contract and 
Addendum, PDQ Lube Center is entitled to an award of attorneys fees and costs of 
$9,187.50, plus additional attorney fees and costs which may be shown by affidavit, Lowell 
Huber to have the right to review and object to the additional attorney fees and costs. 
8. With regard to PDQ Lube Center's claim to damages for lost income, there 
is insufficient evidence for it to make an award of damages at this time. Craig Hansen's 
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testimony was essentially unrebutted but there was no substantiation for his figures. The 
projections suggested 40 vehicles per day would be serviced and then later 60 and 80 or 100, 
but the testimony could just as easily have been that there may be 200 vehicles per day 
serviced. There was nothing to substantiate that and the Court does not believe that the 
evidence met the requirements for an award of damages in that regard. 
9. However, if from this point forward the Court were to determine that Lowell 
Huber is guilty of any future delays in completing his obligations under the contract, the 
Court at that point will allow PDQ Lube Center to present additional evidence, including 
market studies, expert testimony, and other types of evidence, as to lost income from the 
date of the trial forward. The Court does that because it wants to make sure the parties 
understand how the Court views the facts of this case. 
10. Having found that there is no just reason for delaying entry of judgment on 
PDQ Lube Center's claims against Lowell Huber, the Court hereby directs that judgment 
be entered on these claims as a final judgment pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
The contract in dispute contains a promise by Huber to remove certain underground 
storage tanks and obtain environmental clearance, as well as a related promise by PDQ to 
provide a $4,000.00 nonrefundable deposit and to obtain financing. No time is specified for 
performing either promise except the financing which is later excused if not obtained in sixty 
(60) days. The sequence in which these promises were to be performed is nevertheless the 
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very essence of the present controversy. The question thus presented boils down to the 
order in which these parties must perform their related obligations. 
The contract is mainly silent on the time or times for actually removing the 
underground storage tanks and for payment of the $4,000.00 nonrefundable deposit or for 
actually obtaining financing once the buyer and property were deemed qualified under 
paragraph 2.3 of the contract. In such a case, where there is no express indication of 
intended order of performance, the law implies a covenant and condition that the related 
obligations be performed concurrently. Bell v. Elder, 782 P.2d 545 (Ut. App. 1989). 
Since neither party tendered their performance, neither party can claim a breach by 
the other until the party claiming the breach tendered performance of its concurrent 
obligation. Century Twentv-One All Western Real Estate v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 
1982). 
The trial court erred in construing the contract such that Huber's promise was a 
condition precedent to PDQfs promises. 
ARGUMENT 
I The trial court erred in construing Huber's promises and performances as 
being condition precedent rather than condition concurrent to PDQ's promises and 
performance. 
A. General Background 
The parties, with the assistance of a licensed real estate agent, negotiated a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract (REPC) regarding commercial property located at the northwest 
18 
corner of 300 North Main in Logan, Utah. The property had previously been utilized as a 
service (gas) station. 
In light of the prior use of the property and potential environmental problems the 
parties negotiated additional terms and conditions which the parties reduced to an 
attachment referred to as Addendum No. 1. These conditions supplemented the standard 
terms and conditions contained in the REPC and primarily dealt with the removal of the 
underground storage tanks, potential environmental contamination as well as other special 
concerns of the parties. 
The primary goal of contract law is to enforce the benefit of the bargain" reached 
by the parties. With this premise in mind the Appellant Huber would respectfully request 
the Court to carefully consider what each of the parties1 respective expectations and 
obligations were as expressed in the contract. 
PDOfs Expectations and Obligations:2 
* . • PDQ did not want to purchase property which was contaminated. For obvious 
liability reasons PDQ only wanted to purchase the property with the underground storage 
tanks removed and with the negotiated environmental clearance. See Items 1 and 5, 
Addendum 1, REPC. 
* PDQ did not want to purchase the property unless it could be utilized for the 
specific purpose it intended to buy it for, to-wit: a Pennzoil products lube center. See items 
7 and 8, Addendum 1, REPC. 
* PDQ did not want to be obligated to purchase the properly unless both the 
property and it as the buyer qualified for financing. See paragraph 2.2 REPC. 
2 
This is not intended to be an all inclusive list. 
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* If the property "in its current condition" could not appraise for at least the 
value of the "total purchase price" the contract provided that PDQ could walk away from 
its contractual obligation to purchase the property without forfeiting the earnest money 
deposit. Paragraph 2.3 REPC. 
* PDQ assumed the obligation of obtaining financing; however, in the event 
financing was not obtained and neither party canceled the contract within a window of 60-63 
days after acceptance, it was obligated to tender the $125,000.00 purchase price. Paragraphs 
2.3 and 3 REPC. 
Hubert Expectations and Obligations: 
* Huber expected to be paid $125,000.00 less closing costs. Paragraph 2 REPC. 
••"* Huber negotiated the right to receive a $4,000.00 non-refundable deposit to 
cover his out-of-pocket costs for cleanup in the event PDQ did not perform its obligation 
to purchase the property. Item No. 2, Addendum 1, REPC. 
* Huber expected PDQ to apply for financing within five (5) days of his 
acceptance of PDQ's offer. Paragraph 2.1 REPC. 
* Huber expected PDQ to know whether it qualified for financing and the 
financing was in place within sixty (60) days after he accepted PDQ!s offer. Paragraph 2.2 
REPC. 
* Huber obligated himself to remove the underground storage tanks and to 
obtain the negotiated environmental clearance. On the face of the contract the only time 
limit for this to be completed was by the closing date. Paragraph 3 and Items 5 and 1, 
Addendum 1, REPC. 
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* Both parties expected that the closing would occur on or before December 15, 
1993, and the contract expressly stated what was expected of each party to complete the 
purchase. Paragraph 3 REPC. 
* Both parties agreed that the contract expressed their entire agreement and 
superseded and replaced any and all other negotiations, representations, or understandings 
between the parties. Paragraph 14 REPC. 
What created the dispute? It is respectfully submitted that the present dispute arose 
because of an ambiguous contract. Neither the parties, nor the real estate agent who acted 
on behalf of both parties, set a specific time frame or stated with clarity the sequence or 
order in which their respective obligations to each other were to be performed. The trial 
court construed the contract as requiring Huberfs performance to remove the tanks (and 
obtain the environmental clearance) as a condition precedent to PDQ's obligations to obtain 
financing and to tender the purchase price funds. Appellant, for the reasons stated below, 
believes this was error. 
Huberfs Motivation: 
Huber, for apparent financial reasons, did not want to remove the tanks unless he 
had a done deal. If PDQ could not obtain financing and they could walk away with their 
earnest money he would be out of pocket several thousand dollars for the costs of removing 
the tanks, be exposed to unknown cleanup costs as well as the time his business was shut 
down while the underground storage tanks were being removed and the premises excavated 
to get to the underground tanks.3 There is nothing sinister or evil behind Huber's 
Once the tanks are excavated, the state environmental authorities will not 
allow closure until the site is remediated. 
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motivation to delay the removal until financing was approved. There is in fact a certain 
amount of irony in the fact that having been ordered to remove the tanks and obtain the 
environmental clearance PDQ later failed to tender the contract purchase price (Case No. 
960257) and to date Huber has never received the $4,000.00 nonrefundable deposit intended 
to offset a portion of his out-of-pocket expenses. 
PDO's Motivation: 
PDQ did not obtain an appraisal: 1) because of the costs of the commercial 
appraisal; and 2) because Mr. Rush believed it was premature. (Testimony Joel Rush Tr 
48-71 and Craig Hansen Tr 329-337 and 371-381. See Addendums 4 and 5 and Statement 
of Facts paragraph 4.) 
Nothing in Addendum #1 addresses the specific sequence or order of the parties1 
respective performances. The implication of paragraph 2.2 of the contract is just opposite 
to the trial court's interpretation. The clear implication of paragraph 2.2 is that the property 
must "qualify" i.e. be "appraised in its current condition [with underground storage tanks] 
. . . for at least the value of the purchase price." When read in the context of the other 
provisions of paragraph 2 it is clear that whether the parties intended it or not the buyers1 
obligation to obtain the appraisal and financing was a condition precedent to the tank 
removal. 
Bear in mind, however, neither party performed their respective tenders as required 
in the contract by the closing date and the closing date passed. Suit seeking specific 
performance of the contract was initiated three (3) months later. 
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B. PDO'S Contractual Obligations 
PDQ assumed the obligation to secure financing to purchase the subject property. 
The fact that PDQ was unable to secure financing was a risk which PDQ anticipated and 
therefore made Huberfs offer contingent upon. (See contract paragraphs 2 and 9.)4 There 
was never a certainty that financing would or could be obtained and PDQ expressly provided 
for this contingency. 
The fact that PDQ was not able to obtain financing by the closing date is not excused 
unless this court makes a specific finding that the Appellant Huber interfered with PDQ 
obtaining financing or that PDQ's obligation to obtain financing was contingent upon Huber 
removing the tanks by some unexpressed date. It is respectfully submitted that in either case 
the court would not merely be interpreting the contract, it would be rewriting the contract 
entirely.5 
C. General Principles Governing Interpretation of Contracts. 
In Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons. 790 P.2d 107, 110 (Utah App. 1990) the Court of 
Appeals stated the following concerning the general principles governing the interpretation 
of contracts: 
The buyer PDQ identified it would seek SBA financing. (See paragraph 2 
of contract.) This was not required by the seller but was the financing medium 
chosen by PDQ. Buyer specifically agreed to pursue financing and all the 
requirements of the lender. (See paragraph 2.1 of contract.) 
5 
The buyer PDQ, not Huber, chose to pursue SBA financing. The fact that 
the SBA, Bank of Utah, or the appraiser retained by the bank wanted the tanks 
removed before the bank would order the appraisal or continue to process the loan 
was not a factor which was ever discussed by the parties in negotiating the terms 
of the real estate purchase contract. Now to attempt to claim that the Defendant 
somehow interfered with the buyer's financing is literally rewriting the contract 
to allow PDQ to enforce the contract under terms which were never agreed upon. 
Where in the contract (other than closing) is there a date expressly providing 
for the tank removal? There is none. Paragraph 14 provides the contract 
contains the parties' entire agreement. 
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"The cardinal rule is to give effect to the intentions of the parties and, if 
possible, to glean those intentions from the contract itself." LDS Hosp. v. 
Capitol Life Ins. Co., 765 P.2d 857, 858 (Utah 1988); G.GA., Inc., v. Leventis, 
113 P.2d 841, 845 (Utah Ct. App. 1989). 
In addition, we interpret a contract "so as to harmonize all of its terms and 
provisions, and all of its terms should be given effect if possible." G.GA., 
Inc., 113 P.2d at 845; Buehner Block Co. v. UWC Assocs., 752 P.2d 892, 895 
(Utah 1988). 
However, we will not rewrite an agreement to relieve a party from a bad 
bargain. 
It is a long-standing rule in Utah that persons dealing at armfs length are 
entitled to contract on their own terms without the intervention of the courts 
to relieve either party from the effects of a bad bargain. This Court will not 
rewrite a contract to supply terms which the parties omitted. 
Hal Taylor Assocs. v. Union America, Inc., 657 P.2d 743, 749 (Utah 1982) 
(citations omitted). See also Holley vs. Federal American Partners, 29 Utah 2d 
212, 507 P.2d 381 383 (1973); Crowther v. Carter, 767 P.2d 129,132 (Utah Ct. 
App. 1989); Barker v. Francis, 741 P.2d 548, 553 (Utah Ct. App. 1987). 
(Emphasis supplied by Appellant.) 
If the parties intended that the tank removal would be completed by a specific time 
frame or prior to the appraisal or financing being required to be obtained they should have 
included such in the contract. They clearly knew how to express time frames. See Contract 
and Addendum - (8. "site subject to approvaL.within 30 days after acceptance"; 4. "Seller 
retains first right to match lowest demolition bid and complete bid project within 30 days 
after closing"; paragraph 2.1..." within 5 calendar davs after acceptance..."; paragraph 2.2..." 
within 60 calendar days after acceptance"; paragraph 4..." within 48 hours closing"; paragraph 
3..."closing shall be on or before December 15, 1993": paragraph 7. "No later than 2 
calendar davs after acceptance".) 
During arguments following the trial, the trial court implied that it viewed the 
contract as possibly requiring the tanks to be removed prior to closing because the parties 
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placed that particular provision numerically as No. 1 (as opposed to 2, 3, 4, etc.) of the 
Addendum. The trial court committed error in adopting such a construction for at least 
three reasons. First as a practical matter, focusing on the numerical positioning of the item 
is not sound. Provision No. 5 provides: "Seller to remove all fuel and oil storage tanks." 
Provision 5 follows Provision 4 which allows demolition 30 days after closing. Provision 5 
also follows Provision 1 regarding obtaining the environmental clearance yet Provision 5 
would need to be completed to accomplish Provision 1. If the court adopts a time ordered 
sequence by numerical designation of the additionally negotiated terms contained in the 
Addendum then it adopts an impractical rule of law. 
Second, from a policy view point, rewriting the contract under the guise of 
interpreting it to provide that the tanks must be removed by a date certain other than the 
date of closing is patently unfair to the Appellant. Paragraph 14 of the contract provided 
that the terms of the REPC was the entire agreement. In Reed v. Alvey. 610 P.2d 1374, 
1377 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme Court stated the following: 
Before specific performance will be employed by the courts to enforce a 
contract the terms of the agreement must be reasonably certain so the parties 
know what is required of them... 
(Emphasis supplied by the Appellant.) 
This only makes sense. Before a court imposes a consequence upon a party it is only fair 
(concepts of fundamental fairness) that a party know what was required of him. This 
fairness concept is imposed to prevent an arbitrary interpretation of the contract. In this 
instance, where is the fairness to the Appellant in rewriting the contract to provide that he 
was required to take the tanks out immediately or that it was a condition precedent to PDQ 
obtaining financing? When was he ever put on notice of such a requirement? Each witness 
was asked whether they had made an oral or written demand upon the Appellant to remove 
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the tanks prior to closing. Without fail none of the witnesses (banker, real estate agent, 
Hansen, etc.) ever claimed to have put Huber on notice (orally or writing) that: 
1) He (Huber) was holding up the appraisal; 
2) Financing was contingent on the tank removal; or that tanks had to be out 
before December 15, 1993.6 
Third, from a pure legal standpoint, such a conclusion completely ignores the express 
language of the contract, i.e., see paragraph 2.2 "the property is deemed qualified if, on or 
before [60 days after acceptance], the property in its current condition and for buyer's 
intended use, has appraised at a value not less than the total purchase price." The 
importance of this provision is this - it shows the parties clearly intended that the appraisal 
would be completed with certain assumptions which were mutually agreed upon. 
Assumptions as to when the appraisal would be completed; how much the property had to 
appraise for; and what condition the property would be in when appraised, i.e. in its current 
condition and for buyer's intended use. The clear implication is that the appraisal was to 
be done before the tank removal. 
By adopting the legal construction made by the trial court this Court holds Huber 
legally responsible for his failure to take action under circumstances where he was never on 
notice that he needed to act. 
There is no fairness in such a position. The court should not impute knowledge or 
notice to Huber where none was given. Yes, Huber is a certified tank remover, but he is 
The evidence established that this is during a time that Huber was still financially motivated to sell the property. Even up to December 20, 1993, Huber 
testified he was willing to perform if the $4,000.00 was in place. The fact that 
Huber and Kaae both testified that the funds were conditionally tendered (to be 
dispersed through an attorney) makes logical sense if you understand the contract 
would be terminated by December 20, 1993, and Spicer was in no position to turn 
over $4,000.00 without Huber being obligated to remove the tanks. 
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not the SBA or an SBA banker or an appraiser and it would be totally unfair to impute to 
him knowledge of the financing requirements when as testified his primary trade is running 
a scuba diving shop and alternator repair shop and has only removed one other underground 
storage tank. 
How does he know what SBA policies are? When is Huber supposed to have gained 
his SBA and banking knowledge? How would he know that an appraisal could not be 
obtained with the gas tanks in the ground? 
Paraphrasing Howe v. Professional Manivest Inc.. 829 P.2d 160, 164 (Utah App. 
1992): 
"If the parties intended that [the tanks be removed by a specific date other 
than closing], they should have included it in the contract. However we will 
not rewrite a contract to alleviate a contracting parties mistake, but will 
construe it according to the terms as written." supra 164; 
c.f. Hoth v. White. 799 P.2d 214, 217 (Utah App. 1990); Heiner v. SJ. Groves & Sons, supra 
p.110. 
D. Huberfs Duty of Good Faith and Fair Dealing. 
As a basic proposition each party to a contract has a duty to cooperate with each 
other in good faith for its performance. Tanner v. Baadsgaard. 612 P.2d 345, 347 (Utah 
1980) 
The above, however, is only a partial statement of the law. A more complete 
statement of the legal principle is contained in Howe v. Professional Manivest Inc.. supra, 
p. 163. 
"The Howes agreed to assignment of the lease to a corporation that 
would build the shopping center. Beyond the initial assignment agreed to in 
the lease, however, the parties agreed that the Howes1 consent to any other 
future assignments would be required as a prior condition of assignment. 
Because it is the mere act of assignment that constitutes a breach of the lease, 
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and not the legal effect of an assignment, we reject the argument that the 
prohibition against assignment was limited to only those assignments carrying 
some legal effect. Like other provisions of the lease, the lease term against 
assignment is enforceable. 
[3] [4] Manivest also argues, in the alternative, that the Howes acted in 
bad faith by arbitrarily withholding their consent to the assignment. In Zionfs 
Properties, Inc. v. Holt, 538 P.2d 1319, 1321 (Utah 1975), the Utah Supreme 
Court recognized that "there is implied in any contract a covenant of good 
faith and cooperation, which should prevent either party from impeding the 
other's performance of his obligations thereunder; and that one party may not 
render it difficult or impossible for the other to continue performance and 
then take advantage of the nonperformance he has caused." However, there 
is no violation of the duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party is 
simply exercising its contractual rights. Heiner v. S.J. Groves & Sons Co., 790 
P.2d 107, 115 (Utah App. 1990). 
The Howes were not obligated to consent to every proposed 
assignment. Manivestfs argument that the Howes could not arbitrarily 
withhold their consent to an assignment of the lease confuses the duty to seek 
their prior permission with compelled condonation. Manivest assigned the 
lease to Valley Bank without first seeking or obtaining the Howes1 consent. 
The nonconsensual assignment was not permitted by the lease. Manivest 
breached the covenant against assignment, therefore, regardless of the legal 
effect of an actual or purported transfer. (Emphasis supplied by Appellant.)" 
(pp. 163-164) 
c.f. Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd.. 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980). (There is no violation 
of duty of good faith, as a matter of law, when a party is simply exercising its contractual 
rights.) 
Where the contract does not state expressly a specific time to perform the tank 
removal, Huber was entirely within his rights to wait to see if PDQ was going to qualify for 
a loan and that he had a real (qualified) buyer before he spent thousands of dollars in 
removing the tanks, which effectively closes his two businesses and exposes him to uncertain 
clean up costs, all without the benefit of the negotiated purchase price. This risk is not what 
he bargained for and the trial court's construction of the contract contrary to such, 
effectively rewrites the contract, even though the law excludes the possibility of an implied 
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covenant or condition as stated above when there is express provision (albeit without a 
specific time of performance) addressing the subject. 
In Rio Algom Corp. v. Jimco Ltd., 618 P.2d 497, 505 (Utah 1980) the Utah Supreme 
Court stated the principle as follows: 
"It is fundamental that, whether expressed or not, every contract includes a 
covenant of good faith with respect to dealings between the parties. The 
parties to a contract must deal fairly and honestly with each other. Fischer v. 
Johnson, Utah, 525, P.2d 45 (1974); Flying Tiger Line, Inc. v. United States 
Aircoach, 51 Cal.2d 199, 331 P.2d 37 (1958); 3 Corbin on Contracts §541 
(1960). A court will not however, make a better contract for the parties than 
they have made for themselves. J.R Simplot Co. v. Chambers, 82 Idaho 104, 
350 P.2d 211 (1960). An express agreement or covenant relating to a specific 
contract right excludes the possibility of an implied covenant of a different or 
contractory nature. Brimmer v. Union Oil Co. of California, 81 F.2d 437 (10th 
Cir. 1936); Hartman Ranch Co. v. Associated Oil Co., 10 Cal.2d 232, 73 P.2d 
1163 (1937); 20 Am.Jur2d Covenants, Conditions, and Restrictions § 12 (1965). 
. . A duty of good faith does not mean that a party vested with a clear right 
is obligated to exercise that right to its own detriment for the purpose of 
benefiting another party to the contract. A court will not enforce asserted 
rights that are not supported by the contract itself. In re Cohen's Estate, 23 
Ill.App.2d 411, 163 N.E.2d 533 (1960). (supra 505) 
PDQfs argument that Huber has breached the contract when the evidence clearly 
established that Hansen, PDQ and PDQ's banker were unwilling to order or pay for the 
appraisal until the tanks were removed ignores PDQfs clear contractual duty to seek and 
obtain financing or else suffer the consequences that at closing they will be in no position 
to tender their performance. If Huber was in violation of an implied covenant of good faith 
and fair dealing then a fortiori, so was PDQ. 
E. PDQ Never Tendered a Performance as Required by the Contract and 
After the Closing Passed, the Agreement Became a Nullity. 
The parties, during the negotiation process, discussed and arrived at certain terms 
which they set forth in the agreement. Should the court find that the documents somehow 
29 
expressed a contract as to which the court should grant specific performance then the 
Appellant would respectfully submit that there was not a timely performance by PDQ. 
It is clear on the face of the document that the parties contemplated that SBA 
financing would be sought by the buyer for the buyer to complete the contract. See 
paragraphs 2., 2.1, 2.2, and paragraph 9. All of these provisions indicate that the buyer was 
to make application within five (5) days and that the property would need to be qualified 
and loan verification obtained within a sixty (60) day period or else either party could back 
out of the contract paragraph 2.2, 2.3. The fact that no appraisal was obtained or that no 
loan application was made in actuality becomes irrelevant because paragraph 2.3 deems the 
property qualified and the buyer qualified and after the three (3) day period both parties 
are required to go to closing. 
The significance of PDQ's failure to obtain an appraisal and to formally make a loan 
application, however, as a practical matter cannot be overlooked. Without the appraisal and 
failing to make a formal loan application with a lender, PDQ (even though the contract 
deems the property qualified and the buyer qualified) would not be able to obtain a loan 
and therefore did not have the funds to tender its performance on the date of closing, 
December 15, 1993. 
Who decided upon the time frame within which the financing should be completed? 
Obviously after some discussion the parties to the contract agreed that it would take PDQ 
approximately sixty (60) days to arrange financing. Consequently, the burden to obtain the 
financing was upon the buyer. A clear reading of the contract paragraphs 2.1 and 2.2 
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indicate that the buyer needs to proceed with due diligence to get financing in place and an 
appraisal of the property.7 
In this case the parties were acutely aware that the property had underground storage 
tanks and that there was a need to have the tanks removed. With the assistance of a real 
estate agent an addendum was prepared under which the seller agreed to remove the tanks 
at his expense and to obtain an environmental clearance of the property. No specific time 
was stated in the contract for this to be completed. In addition, the buyer agreed to place 
a $4,000.00 deposit towards the cleanup which was non-refundable. There was also no time 
identified as to when this was to be performed. Nowhere in the contract does it indicate the 
order of performance except that paragraph 3 of the contract expressly provides for 
concurrent performance of the buyer's tender of the purchase funds ($125,000) and the 
seller's tender of the deed. 
In Century Twentv-One All Western Real Estate v. Webb. 645 P.2d 52, 55 (Utah 
1982) Justice Oaks, writing for the majority, indicated the following: 
"During the executory period of a contract whose time of performance is 
uncertain but which contemplates simultaneous performance by both parties 
such as the earnest money agreement involved in this case, neither party can 
be said to be in default (and thus susceptible to a judgment for damage or a 
decree for specific performance) until the other party has tendered his own 
performance. 6 Corbin on contracts §1258 (1962). In other words, the party 
who desires to use legal process to exercise his legal remedies under such a 
contract must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to put 
the other party in default. Huck v. Hayes, supra; 15 Williston on Contracts 
§1809 (3d ed. w. Jaeger 1972)." 
7 During trial we learned that Federal/SBA banking regulations require the 
bank to order the appraisal; however, there is no evidence that either party knew 
of this requirement and an objective reading of the contract places the burden 
of getting the appraisal and paying for it within 60 days upon the buyer, not 
Huber. TR 438-444 
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To qualify under this rule a tender must be complete and unconditional. Timpanogos 
Highlands. Inc.. v. Harper. Utah, 544 P.2d 481 (1975); Zionfs Properties. Inc.. v. Holt Utah, 
538 P.2d 1319 (1975). 
In this case the PDQ's banker determined that he did not want to obtain an appraisal 
until the underground storage tanks were removed.8 Mr. Huber, throughout the contract's 
executory period, acknowledged his responsibility to remove the tanks but was hesitant to 
do so until the contract had proceeded to a point that it was certain that the contract would 
be consummated. Mr. Huber was completely within his contractual rights to wait where no 
date for removal was expressed in the contract. The mere fact that the Plaintiffs banker and 
the appraiser9 elected not to initiate the appraisal and start the formal loan process until 
after the tanks had been removed is no fault of the Appellant. This sort of deadlock 
between the parties is exactly what the doctrine of tender of performance is intended to 
solve. 
In Bell v. Elder. 782 P.2d 545, 547 (Ut. App. 1989) this Court stated the following: 
"We recognize that interpreting the contract to require that the Elders merely 
be able to furnish water falls short of requiring them to actually furnish water 
and that the Bells did not contract only for the Elders mere, inchoate ability 
to furnish water. Both the original agreement and the supplemental 
agreement contain express promises by the Elders to actually supply water to 
the Bells. However, although the contract contains a promise by the Elders 
to supply water, as well as a related promise by the Bells to obtain a building 
permit for the construction of a house to receive the water, no time is 
specified for performing either promise. The sequence in which those 
promises were to be performed is nevertheless the very essence of the present 
ft 
°Hxs testimony in this regard was that he did not want to needlessly incur 
the appraisal fee on behalf of his borrower until the tanks were removed. Tr 69-
72 
Q 
3During trial there was evidence from Mr. Jack Draxler that the appraisal 
could be performed subject to the removal and that in order to meet deadlines it 
was possible to complete the appraisal in this fashion TR 438-444. 
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controversy. The situation at trial consisted of the Bells, on the one hand, 
seeking to rescind the contract on the grounds that the Elders had breached 
an obligation to actually furnish water to the property, and, on the other hand, 
the Elders insisting that they would supply the required water when the Bells 
demanded it and performed their obligations. The question thus presented 
boils down to the order in which these parties must perform their related 
obligations. 
In determining the order of performance of exchanged promises, we look first 
to the contract itself, and, if no order of performance is therein specified, we 
apply the common law of constructive contractual conditions. This contract 
is silent on the time or times for actually furnishing water and for obtaining 
a building permit. In such a case, where there is no express indication of the 
intended order for performance, the law implies a covenant and condition that 
the related obligations be performed concurrently. 
Since performance of these obligations was due concurrently, neither party 
could claim a breach by the other until the party claiming the breach tendered 
performance of its concurrent obligation. The rule requiring such a tender 
has been explained in a case in which a real estate purchaser and seller each 
demanded and awaited performance by the other of their respective 
obligations to pay the price and deliver the property. The Supreme Court's 
words in that case apply here as well: 
"This is precisely the sort of deadlock meant to be resolved by 
the requirement of tender. 
. . . . During the executory period of a contract whose time of 
perfoi^ nance is uncertain but which contemplates simultaneous 
performance by both parties,. . . . neither party can be said to 
be in default. . . until the other party has tendered his own 
performance. In other words, the party who desires to use legal 
process to exercise his legal remedies under such a contract 
must make a tender of his own agreed performance in order to 
put the other party in default.1 
This case demonstrates that the rule requiring tender before claiming breach 
of a concurrent promise is not a mere formality or trap for the unweary. 
Here, the claimants1 tender would demonstrate the continued practical vitality 
and purposefulness of the promise owed the claimant. Public policy and 
common sense oppose the waste of installing a culinary line to serve land 
which, for all that appears, will remain unused. The rule requiring tender thus 
serves, among other purposes, to prevent a claimant from insisting upon a 
purposeless performance, or from avoiding his own obligations on pretext." 
(pp. 547-548) 
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In this case the Appellant would respectfully submit that the evidence presented to 
the court clearly shows that on December 15,1993, PDQ had not and was unable to tender 
its performance as required under paragraph 3(b) of the contract. PDQ did not present to 
a closing agent or escrow title company "the monies required to be paid under these 
documents . . . in the form of a cashiers check, collected or cleared funds." 
Consequently, because PDQ failed to tender its performance it is prohibited from 
claiming a breach of contract by the Appellant and moreover PDQ is not entitled to specific 
performance. 
More importantly, because the closing date passed without either party tendering the 
performance required of them the parties are discharged from their contractual obligations 
if neither makes a tender by the agreed closing date. See in particular footnote 1 cited in 
Century Twenty-One All Western Real Estate v. Webb, supra. 
II The trial court erred when it failed to comply with the statutory mandate of 
§42-2-10 and allowed PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc., to pursue a contractual claim 
belonging to an entity doing business as PDQ Lube Center without complying with Title 42 
Chapter 2 V.CJL 
Findings 15 provides as follows: 
Though PDQ Lube Center was involuntarily suspended effective April 16, 
1993, for failure to file its annual report, PDQ Lube Center was reinstated on 
January 17, 1995, under the name of PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc. 
§42-2-10 provides: 
Any person who carries on, conducts, or transacts business under an assumed 
name without having complied with the provisions of this chapter, and until 
the provisions of this chapter are complied with: 
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(1) shall not sue, prosecute, or maintain any action, suit, counterclaim, 
cross complaint, or proceeding in any of the courts of this state; and 
(2) may be subject to a penalty in the form of a late filing fee 
determined by the division director in an amount not to exceed three 
times the fees charged under Section 42-2-7 and established under 
Subsection 63-38-3(2). 
The Defendant raised this issue prior to trial and the trial court ruled that the 
Plaintiff could proceed. Docket # 62, 63, 64, 69, and 75. The Defendant respectfully 
submits the trial court erred as a matter of law and would request the Court to strictly 
enforce the statutory mandate. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth above, the Defendant Huber would respectfully submit that 
the trial court's construction of the contract is in error and the trial court's decision vacated 
with instructions that the contract in dispute be construed as a matter of law as providing 
for concurrent conditions. Inasmuch as neither party tendered their respective performance 
under the contract, neither party was in breach. 
Respectfully submitted thisQ day of May, 1997. 
fffcgSTON &XHAMBEES 
/M- tC /> 
JO$E*HM; CHAMBERS 
Attorney for Defcjn^ant 
(origJnaTsignature) 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that two (2) true and correct copies of the foregoing BRIEF OF 
APPELLANT were mailed, postpaid, to the following this ^ _ day of May, 1997: 
Larry Jones 
HILLYARD, ANDERSON & OLSEN 
175 East 1U0 North 
Logan,JJT84^T 
dNhubaNjnaybnef 
JOSEPH M.JSKAMBERS 
rrney~atka£ , ^ y 
(original signature) 
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Addendum 1 
Real Estate Purchase Contract 
(Trial Court Exhibit 1) 
m REAL ESTATE t URCHASE CONTRACT Dm fe a trcally bind inc Contract. Ufa* Slatr I*w mptim that tkrnxnl real cslalr apcnU a— Ittb twin, bat Ibc lUtjrr MHI Ike SCIWY majr 
REAITOR" fcxatly agrtt tit writing la alter «r dektc pnwrfaium Wthw farm. Ifyow dedrr kj^tarUx adricc.nMraih ywiraUorncy «r UxadHvir. 
"OVs. >-s ) ,+ EARNEST MONEY RECEIPT 
The Ikiycr / . <fc_w« ( ^ J^u2>d fieSTCfL- L+/C~. offers to purctasc lite Pmpcrt)-described below and delivers 
•o Bftikcra^c.asEanicxlMonl^DgmisitS /$0&. - 9 0 in the form of €*&&&/£*/& <Ltffir.M— lolv deposited 
within three Utsitiess days after Acceptance of this offer to purcliasc by all parties. 
m\£&3&0 Received by on (Dale) 
Brokerage Ptionc Number 
—
 A O _ / * U A piTER TO PURCHASE 
- 3 0 , ? N<*, V/lAirO
 % !. PROPERTY; , , 
City V ^ C a g g y N - County O A f . ^ g .Utah. 
I.I Included Items. UnlcssexcliidcdfcfciruhissericidufH ptumhing,licating.air<onditiotting 
and venting fixtures and equipment, water heater, built-in appliance*, light fixtures and bulbs, bathroom fixtures, curtains and draperies and rods, window 
and door screens, storm doors, window blinds, awnings, installed television antenna. Biellitc dishes and system, wall-to-wall carpets, automatic garage 
door opener and transmittcr(s), fencing, trees and shrubs. The following personal property sliall also be included in tills sale and con veyed under separate 
Oil) of Sale with warranties as to title: SfO/JS 
\2 lUcludcd Items. Tlie folknviug items are excluded from this sale „ 
2. PURCHASE PRICK AND FINANCING. Buyer agrees to pay for the Property as follows; 
S )C>OQ.OO Earnest Money Deposit 
Existing Loan: Buyer agrees to assume and pay an existing loan in this approximate amoum presently payable at $_. 
folST) 
per month including principal, interest (presently at % per annum), D real estate taxes, Q properly insurance premium 
and Oniongagc insurance premium. Buyer agrees to pay any transfer and assumption fees. Seller O shall Qshallnolbc 
released from liability on said loan. Any net differences between the approximate balance of the loan shown above and the actual 
balance at Closing shall be adjusted hi OCash D Other 
Proceed* from New I^ oan: Buyer reserves the right to npply for any of the following knns under the terms described below. 
DGmvcntional DFHA H V A J ^ l i c r c S B f r . Seller agrees to pay S toward 
Discount Points and Buyer's other k*an and closing costs, to be allocated at Buyer's discretion. 
G For a fixed rate loan: Amortized and payable owr _ _ years, hucrcat sliall not exceed % per annton; monthly principal 
and interest payment shall not exceed S , or 
H For an Adjustable Rale Mortgage (ARM): Amortized and payable over _ years; initbl interest rate shall not exceed _ % 
per annum; initial monthly principal and inlerest payments sliall mil exceed S Maximum Life Time interest 
rate shall not exceed % per annum. 
Seller Financing: (Sec attached Seller Financing Addendum) 
Other: . 
Balance of Purchase Price in Cash at Closing 
Total Purchase Price ^ 
2.1 Existing/New Loan Applicut ion. Buyer agrees to make application for a loan specified above within r> calendar days (Application Dale) 
after Acceptance. Buyer will have made I*onn Application only when Buyer has: (a) completed, signed, and delivered to the Lender the initbl loan 
apf»licBf Nat and ddcumentation required by llic Lender; ami (b) paid all loan application fees as required by tlie Lender. Buyer will ciNttinuc to provide 
the Lender with any additional dtxnnncntation as required by the Lender. If. within seven calendar days after receipt of written request from Seller. Buyer 
fails to provhi** to Seller written evidence that Buyer lias made Lean Application by llic Application Date, Iheu Seller nia^j*** to tlie Qualification 
Date below, cancel this Conl met by providing written notice to Buyer. Hie Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such writtco*notice?«liatl release to Seller, 
and Seller agrees lo accept as Seller** exclusive remedy, the Earnest Money Deposit witliout the requirement of any furtlier written authorization from 
Buyer. . 
2.2 Qualification. Buyer and the Property must qualify ft* a loan for which application has been made under .Section 2.1 within __1__Lcalendar 
day* (Qualification Date) after Acceptance. T1K* Properly is deemed qualified if, MI or before the Qualification Date, the Property. in its current 
condition ami ft* tlie Buyer's intended use, has appraise- at a value not less than tlie Total Purchase Price. Buyer is deemed qualified if, on or before the 
Qualification Date, the Lender verifies in writing that Buyer has been approved as of the verification date. 
2.? Qualification Contingency. If Seller lias nc« previously voided this Contract AS provided in Section 2.1. ami either the Vntpcrty or Buyer Juts 
failed to qualify on or before IIK* Qualification Dale, either party may cancel this Contract by rioividin-jariMuiUHitice to llic other party within three 
calendar daysaftcr tlie Quulificat ion Date, otherwise Buyer and the Property arc deemed qualified. Tlie Brokerage, upon receipt of a copy of such written 
notice, sliall return fo Buyer Ik* Earnest Money Deposit wilWt the requirement of any ftirthcr written aiithnrizafion of Seller. 
X CLOSING. Tt.iv tc-»-™.i;,w. .J.-.H K% M.*^I ~ , .» i .r«~. J j * , , ^ , \ fiTp 1 9 . 9 3 . Closing shall occur when: (a) Buyer and Seller have 
signed and delivered to each otlicr (or lo thccscrow/tiilc company), all documents required by this Contract, by the Lender, by written escrow instruct it MIS 
and by applicable law; and (b) the monies required to be paid under these documents, have been delivered fo the escrow/iiitc company in the form of 
cashier's check, collected or cleared funds, Sel ler and Buyer sluill cadi pay one-half (1/2) of the escrow Closing fee, tmless otlierwlsc agreed by the parties 
in writing. Taxes and assessments ft* flic current year, rents, and interest on assonicd obligations sliall be pnwaled as set forth In this .Section. Unearned 
deposits on Icnnticics shall be transferred lo Buyer al Closing. Prorations art forth in this Sect it m, sliall he made as of (Opiate of Closing CDtatc of 
possession Mother . jj *s 
4. POSSESSION. Unless otherwise agreed in writing by the parties. Seller shall deliver possession to Buyer within / <£> hour* after Closing. 
~~ mis 
dial prior to signing this 
Con J met written disclosure of the agency reUitHNtslup(s) was provuktMoinnVhcr. ( ) Buyer's Initials ( ) Seller's Init bis. 
A. TITLE TO PROPERTY AND T1TLK INSURANCE (a) Seller has. or shall have al Closing, fee title lo the Properly and agrees lo convey such 
lilie to liuyer by getarrat warranty ilecd, free of financial «wiml*aiiecx as warranted under Section 10.6; (b) Seller agrees lo pay ft* and furnish Buyer 
at Closing with a current starabrd form owner's policy of title insurance in the amount of the Total Purchase Price; (c) the title policy sliall conform with 
Seller's obligations under Kuhscctitwvi (a) and (b) above. Unless otherwise agreed under subsection 8.4, tlie Commitment shall couumt with tlie title 
insurance Oaiuiiitinettt provided uinler Section 1. 
7. SKI.I.KK DISCIX1SURE& No btcr than 2L^ calembr days after Acceptance. Seller will deliver to Buyer the following Sdler Disckwrs: (a) 
• Sellerprof KTty condition disclosure for the Propeiiy.signed aisl dated by Seller, (b) a Commitment for the policy of title insurance required under Section 
6. to he issued by the title insurance company chosen by Seller, including conies of all documents listed as Exceptions on the Commilnicut; (c) a copy 
of all WontltK-iinienlsrebling In any loan now existing which will cncumlicrilic Property after Closing; and (U) a copy of all leases affecting llic Ihmperty 
ma expiring prior to Closing. Seller agrees to pay any title Commitment cancellation charge under subsection (b). 
X. GEN KRAI. CONTINGENCIES, lu addition lo Qualification urxler Section 2.2 this offer is: (a) subject to Buyer's approval of the content of each 
of the hems referetK-etl in Section 7 above, and (h) jArTs _T^MH subject lo Buyer's approval of an inspection of tlie Property. The inspection sluill he 
paid ft* by Buyer and sliall IK* conducted by an iiKlividunl/ctaupany of Buyer's dioicc. Seller agrees to fully cooperate with such iitspcclion and a walk-
through iitspccliM under ScctiouJJ and to make the Property avaibhlc for flic same. 
1.1 Buyer sliall ha vc ^calendar «bys after Acceptance in which to review llic coment «tf Seller Dischaaires, ami, if the inspect itwi ciatf ingency 
applies, tit ciMiiplele and evaluate tlie Insnedion of tlie Pntpeny. and to detcrmiiK*, if, in Buyer's sole discretion, the content of all Seller Disclosures 
(including llic Property Inspection) is acceptable. 
%2 If Buyer does ma deliver a written object ion fo Seller regarding a Seller Disclosure «* tlie Property Inspection within tin* time provided in 
aaibsectitai X.I above,that document or iitspcctiiat wtllhr*deemed appro**})or waived by Buyer. 
Page I of 2 fRigcs JBdler's hiHi^J^r^y^rte JfCJ^/CLS *-" iuW* * Mtiahi C A > D a l c ^ 
S. CONFIRMATION OF AGENCY DISCI.OSURrlAt tlie signing of this Contract tlielisiing agent h U s a g ^ f c - bsC! 
^Sel ler D Buyer, and tlie selling agent ^ rV^gTrN^ SsP\Cgr_jw*escnLs D Seller ^ jtJuycr. Buyer and Seller confirm tU 
by providing written notice to Seller within tlie same seven ealciKu., days. The Brokerage, upon a receipt t* a copy of Buyer's writien notice, stall return 
to Buyer lis? Earnest Money Dcpmil without lite requirement or any further written autmirhatkin from Seller. If litis Contract is not voided by Buyer, 
liuyer's ohjcct'Mio is deemed to have been waived. However, this waiver does not affect those items warranted in Section 11. 
it covenant* of this Contract. 
. _ , » B«yw regarding the condition of the Properly are limited to tlie following: 
10.1 When Seller delivers possession of tlie Properly to Buyer, it will he hroom<lean and free of debris and personal belongings; 
10.2 SelkYwilldclivwpo*scssk»ofuVPropertytoBu^ 
systems, appliances and fireplaces in working order, 
I0J Seller will deliver possession of Ihc Property 10 Buyer with the roof and foundation free of leaks known to Seller; 
10.4 Seller will deliver possession of the Property to Buyer with any private well or septic tank serving the Property in working order and in 
compliance with governmental regulations; 
103 Seller will be responsible for repairing any of Seller's moving-related damage to the Property; 
10.6 At Omtn&&'lkT will br ingcuna^ 
all Mich obligations which Buyer has not so assumed; and 
10.7 As of Closing. Seller has no knowledge of any claim or notice of an environmental, building or aoning aide violation regarding tlie Property 
which ha* not hccTresolvcd. 
11. VERIFICATION OF WARRANTED AND INCLUDED ITEMS. Before Closing. Buyer may conduct a -walkthrough" inspection of the 
Property l«»tktenmnewlkil»cr<irn^ hems warranted by Seller in Section 10.1.10.2.10.3 and 10.4 arc in the warranted condition and lo verify Hems 
mchidcd in Scvtitm | . I arc presently on llie Property, ir any Hem t* not in the warranted condition. Seller will correct, repair or replace it as occcKctry 
or, with ihc consent of Buyer, escrow M amount at Closing lo provide for such repair or replacement. The Buyer's failure lo conduct a ~watk-fnrough~ 
tasp^ion,orkicbimdurwgtlw^ 
warranted in Section 10. shall not constitute a waiver by Buyer of Buyer's rights under Section 1.1 or of uVwarnmtics contained in Section 10. 
12. CHANCES DURfNC TRANSACTION. Seller agrees lhai no dtanges in any existing leases shall he made, no new leases entered into, and no 
sulttfantiat alterations «* improvement to tlie Property shall be made or undertaken without llie written consent of Buyer. 
IX AUTHORITY OF SICNERS. If Buyer or Seller is a corporation, partnership, trust, estate or other entity, tlie person executing this Contract 
on Us behalf warrants his or her authority lo do so ami lo bind Buyer or Seller. 
!4.COMrl,^TKCO^rrRACT.Thtsilt*mlm^^ 
k l w t w tlicrarticxatKJstipmHk^ 
Tills Contract cam** he dunged except by written agreement of the parlies. 
15. DISPUTE RESOLUTION. Tlie parties agree that any dispute or claim relating fortius Contract, including but not limited to the disposition of t h c ^ 
Earnest Money Deposit, llie breach or termination of this Contract, or tlie services relating to this transaction, shall first lie submitted lo mediation in 
accordance with the Utah Real Estate Buyer/Seller Mediation Rules of the American ArbitratUm A<aanciation. Disputes shall include re|iresematH«s made 
by the panics, any Broker or other person or entity in connection with the sale, purchase, financing, condition or other aspect «if the Property lo which 
this Contract pertains, including without limitation, allegations of concealment, misrepresentation, negligence anoVor fraud. Each party agrees lo bear 
its own mas of mediation. Any agreement signed by Ihc parties pursuant to the mediation sliall be binding. If mediation fails, tlie procedures applicable 
and remedies available under this Contract shall apply. Nothing in this Section 15 sliall prohibit any party from seeking emergency equitable relief pending 
mediation. By narking this box D , and adding tlieir initials, llie Buyer ( ). and the Seller ( ), agree that mediation under litis Section 15 is not 
mandaitvy, but is optional upon agreement of all parties. 
16. DEFAULT. If Buyer defaults. Seller may elect to cither retain the Earnest Money Deposit as liquidated damages or lo return tlie Earnest Money 
Deposit and sue Buyer to enforce Seller's rights. If Seller defaults in addition to return of Ihe Earnest Money Deposit. Buyer may elect lo cither accept 
front Seller as liquidated damages, a sum equal to the Earnest Money Deposit, or lo sue Seller for xpedfic performance anoVor damages. If Buyer elects 
lo accept tlie liquidated damages. Seller agrees to pay the liquidated damages hi Buyer upon demand.Where a Section ofthis Contract providcsasncciftc 
remedy tlie parties intend llut tlie remedy dull be exclusive regardless of rights whidi miglit otlierwise be available umlcr common law. , 
17. ATTORNEY'S FEES. In any action arising out of this Contract, the prevailing party shall be entitled lo costs and reasonable attorney's fees. ^ 
IX. DISPOSmON OF EARNEST MONEY. The Earnest Money Deposit shall not be released unless it is authorized by: (a) Section 2, Section KJ 
or Section 15*. (b) separate written agreement of tlie parties; or (c) court order. 
19. ABROGATION. Except for express warranties made In this Contract, the provisions of ibis Contract shall not apply after Closing. 
20. RISK OF LOSS. All risk of loss or damage to the Property shall be borne by Seller until Closing. 
21. TIME IS OF THE ESSENCE. Time b of tlie essence regarding thedatcs set forth in this transaction. Extcrgimg mtca be agreed lo in writing 
by all panics. Perfooitance under cadi Section of this Contract which references a dale shall be re^iiada^Nojujj^r^ 5:00 PM Mountain Time on the 
stated date. 
22. FACSIMILE (FAX) DOCUMENTS. Facsimile transmission of any signed original document, and retransmission of any signed facsimile 
transmission, shall be the same as delivery of an original. If tlie transaction involves multiple Buyers or Sellers, facsimile transmissions may he 
executed in counterparts. 
2.X ACCEPTANCE. Acceptance occurs when Seller or Buyer, responding lo an offer or counteroffer of the other: (a) signs the offer or counter 
where noted to indicate acceptance; and (h) communicate* to tlie oilier party or the otlter party's agent llut the offer or counteroffer has been signed as 
required. 
24. OFFER AND TIME FOR ACCEPT A NCF-puyccofTcrs to purchase the Property on llie above terms and conditions. If Seller docs not accept 
this otter by £u£>0_ O AMAtfM Mountain Tin»£>»g>V \1
 f 10 ^ "^.thUnflW shall lapse; and llie Brokerage shall return the Earnest Money 
" i^t to Buyer. ' S 
lob**-/ q*n*47 
(OfTer Date) (Buyer's Signature) (Offer Date) 
The above date sliall he the Offer Reference Date. 
(Notice Address) (Plume) (Notice Address) (Phone) 
ACCEPTANCFVRFJECTION/COUNTER OFFER 
CHECK ONE: 
CI Acceptance of Offer lo Purchase: .Seller Accepts the foregoing offer on tlie terms and condiikwsspcdfiecl above. 
(Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) (Seller's Signature) (Date) (Time) 
(Notice Address) (Notice Address) 
» CI Rejection: Seller Rejects tlie foregoing offer. _ _ (Seller's initbls) _ _ _ (Date) _ _ _ _ (Time) 
><£Countcr OfTer: Scjtcr presents for Buyer's Acceptance the terms of Buyer's ofTer subject to tlie exceptions or modificationsas specified in tin-attached 
Counter Offer f Z » " .v » 
rapi- 2 of 2 |w*>-- ' Setter's W^g^fflk* * A / * / y f r Itoyc?'«Iwtbh fj^\ OMC *1'1>7»'™S 
THIS MMUI AtTSOVKII aVTUK UTAH SMI. aSTATK COMMBNfm A«HTUK « MVH1C IM/TUK UTAH ATTOtXKYCKKK*Al. JtM>; l*M 
% 
TO EARNEST MONEY SALES AUltttUMUiN 1 
This ADDENDUM/COUNTER OFFER constitutes: ( ) a COUNTER OFFER ( V j a n ADDENDUM to that EARNEST MONEY 
SALES AGREEMENT (THE AGREEMENT) dated the . .between. 
K u b ^ g f r W l ^ g - ^ K . ^ . , .nH k o u i & l ) V U b e ^ assess). 
The following terms are hereby incorporated as part of THE AGREEMENT: 
<fr*Vp)e.te. b i^po.y/c^ oi>ktV> ?£> t ^ y * . ft£len-g-W«cag, iOfirVTU<?o 
p P o ^ - H y p o ^r^fw^.<yU<> CJeA^v^t ® SelWrx. -T*O Y€^ov)r / i l l 
All other terms of THE AGREEMENT shall remain the same. A fSe l le r ( ) Buyer shall have until (AMJPM.) 
1
 » ' 19 * . to accept the terms specified above. Unless so accepted this Addendum shall lapse. 
Date. SignattiNhof (
 # ) Seller rVdiuyer v ^ 
H»TO Time ' » » " - ^ (AJ1/P.M.) 
ACCEPTANCE/COUNTER OFFER/REJECTION 
Check One 
£ ^ I hereby ACCEPT the foregoing on the terms specified above. 
( ) I hereby ACCEP1Uto/£Ke4bing SUBJECT TO the exceptions shown on the attached Addendum.. 
SiQniiur** Sigrutuft DstJ Tim* 
( ) t hereby reject the foregoing (Initials) 
OOCUUENTRECEIPT 
( ) t acknowledge receipt of a final copy of the foregoing bearing all signatures. 
Signttuf o/ Baywls) Oife Signituri ot S*U*r(s) 
I ) I personally caused a final copy of the foregoing bearing appropriate signatures to be mailed on . 
1 9 _ _ by Certified Malt and rtiurrx receipt attached hereto to the ( ) Seller ( ) Buyer. 
Sent by
 M M M M M M M M M M M H . M M M M M M M - M M M M M . M M - M M - . 
This form has been approved by the Utah Real Estate Commission. 
Addendum 2 
Trial Court's Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law and Judgment 
L a r r y E . 
HILLYARD, A! 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0 
^^LSEN 
•95 JUN-8 P4--M 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PDQ LUBE CENTER, INC. a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
R. LOWELL HUBER, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNE T. BOWEN, THE ESTATE OF 
DARRELL J. BOWEN, DENNIS 
GREENE, PETE RIGGS, BOB 
RIGGS, REED HOOLEY, TROY 
HOOLEY and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-10, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Civil No. 94 038 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on February 8, 9, 10, and 16, 1995. The Honorable Ben H. 
Hadfield presided. Plaintiff PDQ Lube Center, Inc. ("PDQ 
Lube Center") appeared by and through its president, Craig 
Hansen, and its attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, 
Anderson & Olsen. Defendant R. Lowell Huber ("Lowell 
Huber") appeared in person and by and through his attorney, 
Joseph M. Chambers of Preston and Chambers. The Court heard 
testimony, received exhibits, and heard arguments of 
counsel. The Court issued its decision from the bench on 
U ^ Y i( ft^5 
February 16, 1995. The Court having before it the evidence, 
and good cause appearing, now enters the following: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. On September 17, 1993, PDQ Lube Center tendered to 
Lowell Huber a Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum 
offering to purchase the property located at North Main 
" Street in Logan, Utah. 
< 
D
. 2. Lowell Huber accepted PDQ Lube Center's offer to 
< 
3 purchase the property by signing the Real Estate Purchase 
i 
g Contract and Addendum on September 22, 1993. A copy of the 
z 
jj Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum was received by 
<2 the Court as Exhibit "1". 
III 
ID 
3. On September 23, 1993, the status of the property 
on the multiple listing service was changed to show that the 
property was under contract to PDQ Lube Center. 
z 
UJ 
U) 
_i 
o 
* 
z 
o 
tfl 
£ 4. Within a week of when the parties entered into the 
z 
< 
6 
< 
Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum, PDQ Lube Center 
J sought new financing by meeting with the Certified 
i 
« Development Company in Salt Lake City with regards to an SBA 
y 
£ loan and was given a checklist of items to complete 
* including the fact that they would need to contact an SBA 
loan sponsor, and consequently met with Joel Rush, a banker 
with the Bank of Utah. PDQ Lube Center met with Logan City 
representatives relative to building site and construction 
permits (a building permit was not formally approved). PDQ 
Lube Center obtained site approval from Pennzoil Products. 
2 
During that same time frame and supplemented over four 
weeks, PDQ Lube Center provided the Bank of Utah with a 
folder on the property, received by the Court as Exhibit 
"2", which included information about the demographics, the 
Pennzoil products and equipment, the building plan, ten-year 
projections, a three-year track record, balance sheet, tax 
CM 
CO 
" returns of PDQ Lube Center in Ogden, Craig Hansen's 1993 
< 
D
. personal financial statement, comparables on the property, 
< 
o 
3 and a bid for construction on the building. 
x 
g 5. No appraisal of the property was ever obtained by 
z 
g PDQ Lube Center or the bank working with PDQ Lube Center to 
5 obtain the SBA loan. Though there was evidence that a loan 
£ could have been performed prior to removal of the tanks and 
z 
S proof of no contamination, there was also evidence that 
o 
* until the tanks were removed and proof of no contamination 
o 
en 
£ shown, an appraisal would have had little value. 
z 
Q- 6. On September 22, 1993, Lowell Huber had permits to 
< 
J remove the underground tanks from the property. He had 
i 
w obtained a bid from Whitaker Construction Company a year 
u 
u. 
% prior for removal of the tanks. He was licensed as a tank 
J
 remover and was doing business as Cache Valley Tank Removers 
and Soil Samplers and had previously removed a tank in a 
land sale in which Martin Spicer, the real estate agent in 
this case, was involved. At the time the contract was 
created, the parties all were aware that Lowell Huber had an 
issued permit for removal of the tanks. The parties -3-
understood and believed that the tanks would be removed 
during the time frame authorized by that permit. Martin 
Spicer testified and the Court believes that Lowell Huber 
said he would move immediately upon signing of the contract 
to remove the tanks. He had a site permit. He was a 
licensed remover. He had his own backhoe and could expedite 
M 
CO 
® removal very quickly. Because of the weather and other 
< 
D
. things, he represented he could proceed within perhaps a 30-
3 day time frame from the date the parties entered into the 
£ Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum, o 
z 
S 7. Martin Spicer had numerous discussions with Lowell 
fe Huber as to why the tanks were not removed. Lowell Huber 
UI 
t wanted to negotiate with Bowens for their participation in 
z 
S the removal costs. (Bowens were predecessors in interest in 
o 
* the property at issue in this case.) When the Bowens 
o 
en 
£ refused to participate in the removal costs, Huber said he 
z 
< 
Q* wanted to kill the deal. 
< 
J 8. The Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum 
i 
g provided that PDQ Lube Center provide a $4,000.00 non-
o 
£ refundable cleanup deposit. On November 12, 1993, PDQ Lube 
J
 Center sent the $4,000.00 deposit to Martin Spicer upon the 
request of Mr. Spicer. 
9. On or about the 15th of November, 1993, Martin 
Spicer met with Lowell Huber and showed him the $4,000.00 
PDQ Lube Center deposit and discussed with Huber not only 
-4-
z 
< 
the deposit but also the unwillingness of the Bowens to 
participate in the costs of removal. 
10. On or about November 15, 1993, and at later times, 
Martin Spicer offered to advance funds to Lowell Huber in 
order that Lowell Huber would have sufficient funds to 
remove the tanks. 
11. During the period of time from November 15, 1993, 
until September 15, 1994, Martin Spicer held the $4,000.00 
z 
< 
§ check in an envelope unopened and did not attempt to deposit 
i 
£ the check into his broker's trust account. On September 15, 
z 1994, following the deposition of Mr. Spicer, Mr. Spicer 
allowed the check to be opened during his deposition and 
K following the deposition deposited the check into his 
broker's real estate trust account, where the deposit sits 
presently. 
12. Lowell Huber has yet to provide PDQ Lube Center 
with a State of Utah Bear River Health Department 
J Environmental Clearance and remove any unacceptable 
i 
» contamination at Huber's expense. 
o 
& 13. Lowell Huber has at no time objected to PDQ Lube 
J
 Center' s attempts to obtain a loan under the terms of the 
Real Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum. Under the Real 
Estate Purchase Contract and Addendum, PDQ Lube Center is 
deemed qualified. 
14. PDQ Lube Center's attorney's fees and costs 
incurred through February 9, 1995 total $9,187.50. Said 
-5-
M 
CO 
I 
< 
I-
3 
z 
fees and costs are reasonable, consistent with those 
generally charged in this community both as to hourly charge 
and time spent, and are reasonably reflective of attorney 
fees and costs incurred in this kind of case and in light of 
the result reached in this case. 
15. Though PDQ Lube Center was involuntarily suspended 
effective April 16, 1993 for failure to file its annual 
report, PDQ Lube Center was reinstated on January 17, 1995 
z 
< 
§ under the name of PDQ Lube Service Center, Inc. 
i 
& 16. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
z 
H 
0) Procedure, the Court finds that there is not just reason for 
delay in entering judgment on PDQ Lube Center's claims 
against Lowell Huber. 
S! Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now 
enters the following: z 
o 
5 CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
Q 
Z 
6 1. PDQ Lube Center and Lowell Huber entered into a 
< 
J valid contract for the sale of the subject property. 
i 
» 2. The contract provided that time was of the essence. 
o 
% 3. PDQ Lube Center made all reasonable efforts to 
* comply in good faith with its obligations under the 
contract, including its providing the $4,000.00 
nonrefundable cleanup deposit. 
4. Lowell Huber failed to make a good faith effort to 
remove the tanks. On the contrary, when Lowell Huber could 
not obtain contributions from a third party, Lowell Huber 
engaged in bad faith conduct in an attempt to kill the deal. 
5. Any failure of PDQ Lube Center to perform under the 
contract was directly related to or caused by Lowell Huberfs 
bad faith and failure to perform. 
6. PDQ Lube Center should be awarded an order of 
N 
CO 
® specific performance from this Court directing Lowell Huber 
< 
D
. to comply with the contract by: 
< 
3 (a) providing PDQ Lube Center with a state and 
i 
g local environment clearance certificate for the site; and 
z 
6 (b) both parties are ordered to comply with the 
5 contract terms. 
< 
5 7. An order should be entered requiring Lowell Huber 
z 
S to convey the property to PDQ Lube Center if PDQ Lube Center 
o 
* is able to tender the full purchase price within 84 days 
o S following the proof to PDQ Lube Center of environmental 
Q 
Z 
Q- clearance for the site. The original contract was 84 days 
< 
J from signing until closing. The time frame now may be 
longer because Lowell Huber will now have to obtain a new 
i 
£ removal permit and the Court doesn't have any information on 
J
 how long that will take. Originally, there was an existing 
permit. That permit has expired. Consequently, the Court 
is selecting that 84-day figure or term and saying that will 
commence on the date the certificate is provided showing 
that the site is environmentally clean. 
-7-
8, Pursuant to paragraph 17 of the Real Estate 
Purchase Contract and Addendum, PDQ Lube Center is entitled 
to an award of attorney's fees and costs of $9,187.50, plus 
additional attorney fees and costs which may be shown by 
affidavit, Lowell Huber to have the right to review and 
object to the additional attorney fees and costs. 
5 
D 
9. With regard to PDQ Lube Center's claim to damages 
for lost income, there is insufficient evidence for it to 
z 
< 
o 
3 make an award of damages at this time. Craig Hansen's 
i 
g testimony was essentially unrebutted but there was no 
z 
g substantiation for his figures. The projections suggested 
S 40 vehicles per day would be serviced and then later 60 and 
£ 80 or 100, but the testimony could just as easily have been 
z* 
S that there may be 200 vehicles per day serviced. There was 
o 
* nothing to substantiate that and the Court does not believe 
o 
£ that the evidence met the requirements for an award of 
Q 
Z 
• damages in that regard. 
< 
J 10. However, if from this point forward the Court were 
i 
« to determine that Lowell Huber is guilty of any future 
u 
fc delays in completing his obligations under the contract, the 
* Court at that point will allow PDQ Lube Center to present 
additional evidence, including market studies, expert 
testimony, and other types of evidence, as to lost income 
from the date of the trial forward. The Court does that 
because it wants to make sure the parties understand how the 
Court views the facts on this case. 
-8-
2 
z 
< 
Z 
< 
11. Having found that there is not just reason for 
delaying entry of judgment on PDQ Lube Center's claims 
against Lowell Huber, the Court hereby directs that judgment 
be entered on these claims as a final judgment pursuant to 
Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. 
Dated this 3 day of J^ L 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
§ / G^t 
i BEN H. HADFIEL 
g District Court Jud 
z 
I-
co 
K 
Ik 
H 
W 
< 
u 
rs 
z" 
id 
<0 
-J O 
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z 
o 
0) 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW was mailed, postage 
prepaid, on the y day of \J//^/£ J , 1995, to the 
following: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
| Attorney for Defendant 
• 31 Federal Avenue 
£ Logan, UT 84321 
< L. Brent Hoggan 
3 Attorney for June T. Bowen and 
i the Estate of Darrell J. Bowen 
g P. 0. Box 525 
z Logan, UT 84323-0525 
CD 
c Heinz J. Mahler 
S Kipp & Christian P.C. 
JJ Attorney for Pete Riggs and 
£ Bob Riggs 
z 175 East 400 South #330 
2 Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
o 
z 
James C. Jenkins 
§ Attorney for Reed Hooley and 
5 Troy Hooley | 67 East 100 North 
o Logan, UT 84321 
< > 
_1 
0) 
111 
o 
u. 
° g:\data\lej\pdq.fof 
< 
-I 
Secretary / 
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HhES&E? •AI*!^>lS12^LSBN 
A PROFESSIONAL CORPORATION 
A T T O R N E Y S A T L A W 
175 EAST FIRST NORTH 
L O G A N , U T A H 84321 
TELEPHONE (801) 7 5 2 - 2 6 1 0 
IN THE FIRST JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT OF CACHE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
PDQ LUBE CENTER, INC. a 
Utah Corporation, 
Plaintiff, 
vs, 
R. LOWELL HUBER, 
Defendant and 
Third-Party Plaintiff, 
vs. 
JUNE T. BOWEN, THE ESTATE OF 
DARRELL J. BOWEN, DENNIS 
GREENE, PETE RIGGS, BOB 
RIGGS, REED HOOLEY, TROY 
HOOLEY and JOHN AND JANE 
DOES 1-10, 
Third-Party Defendants. 
The above-entitled matter came on regularly for trial 
on February 8, 9, 10, and 16, 1995. The Honorable Ben H. 
Hadfield presided. Plaintiff PDQ Lube Center, Inc. ("PDQ 
Lube Center") appeared by and through its president, Craig 
Hansen, and its attorney, Larry E. Jones of Hillyard, 
Anderson & Olsen. Defendant R. Lowell Huber ("Lowell 
Huber") appeared in person and by and through his attorney, 
Joseph M. Chambers of Preston and Chambers. The Court heard 
testimony, received exhibits, and heard arguments of 
counsel. The Court issued its decision from the bench on 
February 16, 1995. The Court having before it the evidence, 
FIRST DISTRICT COURT 
CACHE COUNTY 
#95 -8 P4'45 
JUDGMENT 
Civil No. 94 038 
Judge Ben H. Hadfield 
having heretofore entered its Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law, and good cause appearing, 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED as follows: 
1. That PDQ Lube Center be and is hereby awarded an 
order of specific performance from this Court directing 
Lowell Huber to comply with the contract by (a) providing 
<M 
CO 
® PDQ Lube Center with a state and local environment clearance 
< 
D
. certificate for the site; and (b) both parties are ordered 
< 
3 to comply with the contract terms. 
i 
K 2. Lowell Huber is required to convey the property to 
z 
S PDQ Lube Center if PDQ Lube Center is able to tender the 
IL 
«; full purchase price within 84 days following the proof to 
hi 
S PDQ Lube Center of environmental clearance for the site. 
z 
$ 3. PDQ Lube Center is awarded attorney's fees and 
o 
* costs of $9,187.50, plus additional attorney fees and costs 
o 
£ which may be shown by affidavit, Lowell Huber to have the 
o 
z 
< 
O 
or 
< 
right to review and object to the additional attorney fees 
5 and costs. -73tff! 
i POQ 
• 4. Lowell Hube±r- is awarded no damages for lost income, 
g 
£ there being insufficient evidence for the Court to make an 
J
 award of damages at this time. 
5. If from this point forward the Court were to 
determine that Lowell Huber is guilty of any future delays 
in completing his obligations under the contract, the Court 
at that point will allow PDQ Lube Center to present 
additional evidence, including market studies, expert 
-2-
* 
€D 
X 
< 
z 
< 
o 
3 
testimony, and other types of evidence, as to lost income 
from the date of the trial forward. 
6. Pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, this Judgment is a final judgment as to PDQ Lube 
Center's claims against Lowell Huber. 
Dated this ^5 day of J(jL , 1995. 
BY THE COURT: 
BEN H. HADFI&LD / r 
g D i s t r i c t Court J/udge 
z 
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H (0 
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z 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing 
JUDGMENT was mailed, postage prepaid, on the \f day of 
\ 1/141C.S , 1995, to the following: 
Joseph M. Chambers 
Attorney for Defendant 
31 Federal Avenue 
| Logan, UT 84321 
o 
z 
J L. Brent Hoggan 
°. Attorney for June T. Bowen and 
< the Estate of Darrell J. :.owon 
3 P. 0. Box 525 
i Logan, UT 84323-0525 
£ 
O 
2
 Heinz J. Mahler 
| Kipp & Christian P.C, 
E Attorney for Pete Riggs and 
« Bob Riggs 
J| 175 East 400 South #330 
? Salt Lake City, UT 84111-2314 
z 
S James C. Jenkins 
° Attorney for Reed Hooley and 
* Troy Hooley 
g 67 East 100 North 
£ Logan, UT 84321 
o 
z 
< 
Q 
< 
> 
Secretary ' y 
w- g:\data\lej\pdq.jdg 
u 
u 
Addendum 3 
Proffer at Trial 
Transcript p. 10 
1 I conflicts this was the most convenient time for him* 
i 
2] I plan on calling Craig Hansen, possibly Marty 
Collins., who are the two principles with PDO in this 
4j transaction. And then Marty Spicer, who is the broker 
! 
5 1 for both parties in the transaction. That's 
6 essentially our case. It's not a terribly complicated 
7 case in our view and we chose to keep it very simple. 
8 MR. CHAMBERS: My concern is that, as I've 
9] researched the SBA process, like most governmental 
10j agencies they do have a specific application which 
111 they use. It's entitled an SBA Form 4. It outlines a 
12 checklist of certain items and the notebook package 
13 presumptively could be part of that. Since I didn't 
14 I receive the actual application I just want to be sure 
15 i I'm not going to be caught in any surprise and they 
i 
! 
161 say at the last minute here it is. 
17 | THE COURT: All right. Now., to be sure I 
18 | understand where we're at, at least at this point that 
19 | is a nonissue? There isn't an SBA 4 that was 
20 | completed and that you'll proffer, is that correct? 
21| MR. JONES: That's correct 
THE COURT: Okay. Go ahead. Mr. Chambers. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I guess it's just a -- in that 
case it's pretty easily resolved. I would think. The 
only other aspect of it would be to the extent of 
Addendum 4 
Testimony of Joel Rush, Banker 
Transcript pp. 48-76 
; Joe 1 Rush - D 
1 j equipmen t. 
2 ! Q. There were also n number of plat maps on the 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
3 
9 
10 
proper ty? 
A. Uh-huh . 
Q. Do you recall seeing those? 
A. Yes. 
O. And the fax date on those is October 27, 
1993. Then a pretty picture on the back cover? 
A. Yes. 
0. Was there ever a formal -- was there ever an 
11 j application made to the SBA for the loan? 
12 
13 
14 
A. No. Umm, there was discussion with -- on 
this particular kind of loan, the 504 loan, the 
driving entity is the Certified Development Company. 
15 I They actually go to the SBA and get approval and then 
i 
i 
16 j we are bound by that approval. No application, but I 
i 
i 
17 | know discussion was had with them and they referred 
18 
19 
the borrowers to me 
Q. And why was no application made, formal 
application made, to the SBA? 
A — an si*>^6eAtt) 
application is k 
put people into it unt 
deal. We we 
being^ 
roiect. We seldom 
feel like it's a viable 
tion. I remember 
have sat on 
Joel Rush - D 
d^fhis to weri 
e the cash 
the sole 
ers the 
prof i t proceed. 
ty farther 
on the thing^is apparently they developecTSsonie kind of 
probleni/ath the seller over the land and they asked 
9 I for the package back. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object on foundation 
and it's nonresponsive to the question. 
THE WITNESS: What's the question? 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. You may 
follow up if you choose, Mr. Jones. 
MR. JONES: Okay. 
Q, (BY MR. JONES) If I can catch up with what 
you've testified to, you've indicated that you were 
enthusiastic about the project? 
A. (Witness nodded his head.) t^£^^^cfi^//0c> «" 
Q. In your opinion, and let me lay some 
foundation here, to this date, that is, until October 
of 1993, how many SBA loans had you handled 
approximately, as a banker? 
A. Oh, you know, I would imagine in that year, 
1993, by that time probably 15 or 16, in addition to 
o -> ~ <=> A a 
Joel Rush - D 
1 ; other commercial projects. 
2 j Q. So you do a lot of this kind of stuff? 
3 i A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
i 
4 I 0. And you still do it, don't you? 
i 
5 i A. Yes. 
6 
7 
8 j 
i 
f 
9 | 
j 
1 0 I 
j 
11
 i 
12 | 
i 
i 
13 
14 
15 ! 
1 6 I 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Bank 
O 
A 
0 
In fact, you're employed at Guardian State 
(Witness nodded his head.) 
And what's your title there? 
I am a branch manager and commercial lender. 
And you still do SBA loans? 
A. Yes^ 
Q^ r Let me ask you, then, based on your 
experience as a banker, had the property been — Had 
t p. is entire package been put together, the propert; 
lonveyed and so on, would this have been a successful 
lloan? 
A. Yes. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object, Your Ho/lor 
The &s§sis of that is it's pure speculation, ylf the 
court wish>s^to rule on it over thaJ^-oiSjection , I'd 
like to voir dire the witness. 
THE COURT: I'll allow you some voir dire. Go 
ahead 
ipsa v^ -oJU' 
^ 
•* en 
Joel Rush - Voir Dire 
VOIR DIRE EXAMINATION 
2 I BY MR. CHAMBERS 
O . Mr. Rush, to get an SBA loan there's actually 
an application that you make to the SBA, isn't that 
correct? 
A . True. 
0. And that is what's known as an SBA Form 4? 
A. That is for a 7-A loan. They were applying 
for a 504 7-A. 
O. Okay. But the 504 has a specific application 
similar to the Form 4? 
A. The bank wouldn't take that application, no. 
O. The bank wouldn't take which application? 
A. We would not — on a 504 loan the bank does 
not use an SBA application. The entity that works 
with the SBA is a Certified Development Company and I 
don't know what kind of application they use, 
Q • But there is an application? 
A. I'm sure there is, yes. There's a lengthy, 
working relationship to get it put together. I've 
never seen the application. 
0. Okay. Have you ever known an SBA loan --
let's say of the type that the Form 4 is used, have 
you ever known the SBA to grant that type of loan 
without an SBA Form 4 having been submitted? 
Joe 1 Rush - D 
1 | A. No. 
! 
2 | 0. With regards to — you called this other one 
! 
3 ! a certified something? 
4 i A- A Certified Development Company. 
5 
6 
7 
8 
Q. Okay. And have you ever known the Certified 
Development Company, in conjunction with the SBA, to 
grant -- what type of loan did you say it was? 
A. 504 . 
O The 504. - - to errant the 5 04 without an 
10 i application having been made? 
11 
12 
13 
A. Ho, you don't. That's not the way it works 
Q. And it's your testimony that in this case 
neither the SBA Form 4 or the other form for the 
14 j Certified Development Company was submitted? 
15 [ A. They were not. 
i 
16 i MR. CHAMBERS: I'd say that his testimony, Your 
17 
21 
24 
25 
Honor, would be purely speculative on that point 
sBUsfc^A^J > 
THE COURT: I think that goes to how much weight 
the testimony should carry. I'm going to allow the 
a n s w e r , s u b j e c t t o t.hp w <-* •» >-—dir-e—e-xeuuiiid I i o«—thaf—h_ajs 
DIRECT EXAMINATION ( C o n t i n u e d ) 
BY MR. JONES: 
Mr. Rush, so that I'm clear, you did how many 
Joe 1 Rush - D 
SBA loans in 1993. approximately? 
A- This is just conjecture, but I would imagine 
I was involved in. you know. 15. 16* 
Q. Okay. And previous to that how many years 
have you done SBA loans r v~v w ^ ^ ^ * O w i ^ 
A* The prior year I was involved in them. I've 
always been in commercial lending, which is just a 
different approach. 
0. So in the prior year you also did SBA loans? 
A. (No visual or audible response.) 
0. How many did you do that year, approximately? 
A. That's when I was just getting started with 
Bank of Utah. I created an SBA department for them. 
That would have probably been 10 or 12. 
O. Okay. Based on your experience, then, with 
SBA and those 25, 27 or so loans, what is your opinion 
as to the success of this loan? 
MR. CHAMBERS: And again I'm going to object on 
foundation. I don't mean to — I realize this can be 
tedious, but my objection is that we're talking about 
a specific 504 and there's no testimony as to what his 
experience has been as to the 504. The only thing 
I've heard so far is that he's never done a 504. 
THE WITNESS: No, I've done many 504s. 
MR. CHAMBERS: Okay. Then I missed that. 
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1 | THE COURT: I guess at this point I'll require 
i 
2 ! further foundation- Go ahead. 
3' | 
4 ! loan? 
i 
I 
5 ! 
6 
7 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Okay. Have you done a 504 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many? 
A. You know, we did more 7As than 504sf but I've 
8 | probably done ten. 
9 j 0. Okay. 
10 | A. Been involved with ten 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 ! 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
Q. And have you been doing SBA loans since '93? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you do SBA loans last year? 
A. Yes. 
Q. How many? 
A. Last year, 1994, it would be 20. 20 plus. 
Q. Okay. And now we're up to around 45 SBA 
loans. How many of those SBA loans were 504 loans? 
A. Tn 1994 I probably did five. 
Q. Okay. And based on your experience with 
those loans, if the property had been clean, had been 
sold, closed on December 15, 1993, would SBA lending 
have been obtained? 
A. Umm, — 
Q. Tell me what you know, tell me what you don't 
Joel Rush - D 
know . 
2 j A. Can T just give you some general information? 
3 0. Yes. 
4 A. Tn all of the SBA applications that T have 
5 worked with, at the various banks I've worked with, I 
6 have never had one turned down for credit reasons. 
7 That indicates to me that if I think the deal is 
8 viable, SBA will think it's viable. That is my 
9 I answer. I mean, I've had them turned down for 
technical or legal reasons, but as far as the credit 
analysis, I have never had one turned down. I've 
never had them send them back to me and say that 
doesn't fly. 
In my opinion, SBA generally will do a lot 
more and take a lot more risk than the bank will. So, 
in my opinion. I encouraged this — we didn't ever get 
to a formal presentation to the committee because I 
needed more information, but I encouraged the 
borrowers to proceed because I felt like it was 
viable. That implies that I felt like SBA would have 
gone along with it. 
Q. What do you specifically recall held up this 
loan, held it from going to the application phase? 
A. They were going to get an application. 
Q. "They" being? 
« « ^r« £ ^ 
A 
0 
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The borrowers. 
Okay. __— 
It's pointless to go through, in m 
large application process., whic 
without determining the qualj/t 
\ status on the property. •»-
A. I expressed some concerns when I found thay 
there had been a — previously been a service sy 
Ion the property. That immediately leads 
'of EPA concerns. That would have to 
g±t,r W" /Veoec &t&&J 
0 . You've had experience wjj: h KPA problems ^ 
before? 
A. Yes. I just completed an extensive problem 
— a remediation project on one that we financed. 
0 . Okay. And would SBA have lended on this 
property i_f there was,, an environmental prob 1 em? 
^ — /Jc>/t' /t,£Hpd(c$ii}e? 
A. The bank wouldn't have. 
Q. The bank wouldn't? 
A. Not even if they had submitted the 
application. 
Q. The SBA is essentially a guarantee of the 
funds for the bank loan? 
A* They do no funding. They underwrite what we 
do. Bank of Utah was a CLM lender, which meant that 
they would give a cursory review of our stuff., because 
Ui?*i 
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12 
13 
14 
15 
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17 
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of our level of expertise, and just approve it in 
three days. As I said. I've never been turned down 
for cr^ e^ -i-t—i bdbuiift. 
Q . If P D 0 is successful in obtaining this 
property, clean of contamination, are you still 
^willing to assist them in obtaining a loan? 
A. Yes. I expressed that to them 
0. That's what you still do? 
A. Yes. 
Q . It would be a different bank? 
A. A different bank. We're the number two SBA 
lender in the state, trying to be number one. We're 
pretty aggressive. I would be very interested in 
looking a t i t. 
Q. This is still a viable project, in your 
opinion? 
A. From what I've seen economically and 
financially, yes. Once again, I don't know what the 
property — what the whole property would appraise for 
based on the proposed construction. I have no idea 
what type of remediation is going to be required and 
how long that wouJU3_take 
Q. Let's talk about appraisals for just a 
moment. Is it necessary, before a loan goes through, 
to have an appraisal of property? 
1 
2 
3 
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8 
9 
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A. Umm, before a loan is approved. I've had 
them approved subject to a certain value that I felt I 
could get on an appraisal, but the loan never closes 
without — it's against the law, banking regulations, 
to close without an appraisal. We would have to have 
a certified appraisal done. 0?&ft 7 Q. Does it make sense to appraise a piece of 
property — does it cost money to do a commercial 
apprai sal? 
A, A substantial amount. Generally 2500 bucks 
It can be more. 
Q. Okay. And until the p r Ojgjtr t y j^s_c lean of 
contamination, does it make sense to do that 
apprai sal? 
ao una u 
MR. CHAMBERS: I object. He's asking the witness 
to speculate on a business practice as to whether it 
makes sense. That's irrelevant for the purpose of the 
contract. The contract either requires the loan 
application to be proceeded with in an orderly fashion 
or not. It doesn't give excuse anywhere in the 
contract whether a banker feels it makes sense or not. 
It's irrelevant. 
MR. JONES: That's not an objection, it's an 
argument, Your Honor. The fact of the matter is that 
the contract itself says subject to new financing and 
Joel Rush - D 
1 the addendum requires Lowell Huber to clean the 
2 I property. To suggest that the contract says anything 
3 | other than that is incorrect. I don't know what the 
objection is. quite frankly. That's an argument of 
the case. What I'm asking the witness is whether or 
not it makes sense to do an appraisal if the property 
is not clean . 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow the answer. Mr. 
Chambers. I'll go back and review the contract. If 
your argument is correct, then the answer is not 
relevant and I can disregard it. 
MR. CHAMBERS: Okay. 
0. (BY MR. JONES) For loan purposes for the 
bank, does it make sense to have an appraisal done 
unless the property is clean of envi r o nment a1 
contamination? 
A. Not to me. I mean, you wouldn't proceed — I 
mean, the purpose of getting the appraisal is to be 
able to assess how much money you can 1end . If the 
pr pperjty-^appra ijs^s for^a-c^rtain dol lar amount, but is 
environmentally damaged and has to be remediated, the 
deal stops there until it is ta k e n care of. 
Q. How current does the appraisal have to be for 
lending purposes? 
A. One year. 
O a rr o R Cj 
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Q . And so let's assume that PDQ had gone ahead 
and done an appraisal in the fall of '93, it would 
cost them how much again, approximately? 
A. It depends. Anywhere from 1800 to 3,000 
<fl 4- &<ZGS &U**fac*u — tfaJ? TZt&f "W*^ 
d o l l a r s . V k * ^ rj / ^ / ^ ^ ^ . ^ ^
 r^ aU^^iJ^ 
Q. Okay . And now w a J r e a y e a r a n d a _ h a l f b e y o n d 
t h a t . &UJ~ <€BE& /4j^c«<&^ y%&r 
A. The appraiser would have had to address some 
SO* C /Jo f~ /flsHt(*< & 4«j /C* %>**- /trt& 
e n v i r o n m e n t a l i s s u e s a s w e l l . T h a t ni^ Ar h a v e r e d u c e d 
fie. usHv**^ — 
the value of the property because of the unknown. 
That is conjecture on my part. 
Q. And if the appraisal isn't within a year, 
then you have to have a new appraisal, don't you, so 
that would be the expenditure of another 1300 to 3.000 
dollars, correct? 
A. True. Or, you know, an appraiser could 
conceivably update the thing for a reduced fee. 
Q. Generally what is the relationship between 
the bank, that is, yourself, and PDQ in a transaction 
of this kind? Who drives who in obtaining the loan? 
A. Well, bankers are pretty — 
MR. CHAMBERS: Objection, relevancy. j 
THE COURT: Mr. Jones, what's the relevance? 
MR. JONES: One of the contentions that the i 
defendant is making in this case is that PDQ didn't do 
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1 ! everything it was supposed to do or could have done in 
2 ! obtaining a loan* What I'm seeking to establish with 
3 '•! the witness is the relative responsibilities of the 
i 
! 
4 1 parties in the transaction. And my follow-up question 
I 
5 1 is was there anything PDO could have done to further 
6 
7 
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expedite this process than they've already done. 
THE COURT: I'll allow the question. The way 
it's posed, it does seem as to present some 
9 1 difficulties, because if the bank, for instance, had 
neglected to do some things.. I'm not sure that 
resolves any issues. Go ahead and ask the question. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Generally,, then, the 
relationship between the bank and the borrower as to 
obtaining a loan is what? 
A. The driving — that's a difficult question to 
answer. Generally the borrower is pushing the bank to 
get the deal done. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever ask PDQ for anything that 
they didn't provide you? 
A . No . 
Q. And did PDQ at any point say that it didn't 
want a 1oan? 
A. They never said they didn't want a loan. 
They did take the package back. 
Q. And in your relationship with PDQ, has PDQ at 
Joe 1 Rush - D 
1 j all times pushed for the loan? 
2 | A. Yes. until they removed the package based on 
3' | some problem they were addressing. 
4 | MR. JONES: Okay. (Pause.) Nothing further at 
i 
5 j this time. Thank you. 
THE COURT: This is an appropriate time to take a 
7 ! morning recess and then begin cross-examination. 
| 
( 
3! We'll take about ten minutes. 
9 i (Morning recess. ) 
10 i MR. JONES: Your Honor, I did fail to move for 
11 j admission of Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 2 and would ask 
12 j to do that at this time . 
13 j MR. CHAMBERS: T would object to that on the 
i 
14 | basis that I'd like Mr. Jones and I to have the 
15 ' opportunity to, over the lunch hour, organize my 
16 j exhibit in the same order it is to make sure I have 
17 | all the copies of what has been presented in the 8
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
exhibit and then I will pro ably stipulate to its 
admission at that time. 
THE COURT: I'll take the motion under advisement 
pending the lunch hour and the opportunity for that 
review. 
MR. JONES: The only problem I have with that is 
that when we get to the end of Mr- Rush's testimony, 
my hope is to then excuse him. If for some reason 
Joel Push - D 
1 I there's a problem, you know, in getting that 
2 I information in proper order., then I wouldn't have a 
J i witness. 
4 I THE COURT: Let me ask a couple of questions, 
i 
5 | This Exhibit 2 that I'm holding, if I understood you 
i 
i 
I 6 | correctly. Mr. Jones., you indicated earlier this 
i 
I 
7 | morning that this document itself was physically given 
8 | to Mr. Chambers for a period of time, is that correct, 
j 
91 or was it a copy? 
! 
10 j MR. JONES: I just gave him a copy. 
11 | THE COURT: All right- Has he ever had an 
! 
12 j opportunity to compare his copies against this? 
13 j MR. JONES: No. I sent that over to Kinko's and 
14 j had copies made and that's what I gave to Mr. 
1 5 j C h a m b e r s . 
16 ! MR. CHAMBERS: And my representation to the 
i 
17! court, and I'm not trying to be a stickler on this, is 
i 
18 j that I got it in two portions and in fact they are out 
19 j of order. 
20 I MR. JONES: He got the financial stuff the next 
21 | day. He got everything but the financial statement 
22 j and the tax returns the first day and then got those 
23j the next day. 
24 | THE COURT: Let's do this. I understand the 
25 concern you have with the witness being available if 
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1 | there's a problem with any part of the document. Mr. 
2 | Chambers is certainly entitled to satisfy himself and 
3| his client that what he's looking at is what I'm 
4 ! looking at. Maybe, after we have the 
5 I cross-examination, if we need to we'll recess and you 
6 1 can do that before we excuse the witness* 
i 
7 j MR. CHAMBERS: And I apologize. I'm not trying 
3 \ to be obstreperous. 
9 j THE COURT: No, that's fine. 
f 
10 I CROSS-EXAMINATION 
| 
11 j BY MR. CHAMBERS: 
12 | Q. Mr. Rush, you indicated, if I understood your 
13 j testimony correctly, that a copy of the real estate 
14 ! purchase contract was included as part of the 
15 ! materials in the binder that you'd received, is that 
i 
16 ; correct? 
17 S A . I think it was. 
O. And for the record, although we are on video, 
you need to be sure to speak loudly. 
A. Yes, I believe that is the original thing 
that they delivered to me. 
Q, And it's my understanding that other than 
that, the material that's included in there, you 
received no other material? 
A / W e l l , I don't know in what order all the 
Joel Rush - X 
1 j stuff came. There were some things I asked them for., 
i 
2 j supplemental information about the area, competition 
3 j and building expenses that may have been -- costs that 
4 
5 
6 
7 
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10 
11 
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may have been provided later. I can't make a 
definitive answer on that. I know I asked for 
additional information. 
Q. So you don't know if there were other 
materials thai: were given you that are not included in 
9 ) that booklet? 
A. I know there were — they're now in the 
booklet, I believe. I don't know. I didn't check. 
There were other things I asked them for to help me in 
my analysis that were not initially in the booklet. 
Q. Okay. 
A. That's typical. 
0. Let me see if I can summarize, and I'm not 
trying to put words in your mouth, but I don't think 
it's that relevant of a point and I want to move on. 
What I'm hearing you say is that the material you 
received, all the material you received, is in the 
booklet, it's just that not all the material was there 
to begin with and it was supplemented as you requested 
additional information? 
A. That's what I said. I haven't seen the 
booklet to see whether the additional things I 
Joel Rush - X 
1 I requested have been put in the booklet. I don't know 
2 ; 0. Why don't we take an opportunity to do that 
3 : if you wouldn't ir.ind. 
4 I THE COURT: I'll hand the witness the actual 
5 i 
i 
6 | 
i 
| 
8 i 
i 
9 i 
i 
1 0 j 
i i ! 
» l 
1 2 I 
i 
! 
1 3 i 
f 
i 
i 
1 4
 ! 
15 ; 
exhibi t. 
(Pause in the proceedings-) 
THE WITNESS: Yes, the information on the lot, 
copies of some other appraisals indicating some 
properly values and a cost estimate that I believe I 
requested are in here. 
Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) Okay. Thank you very 
much. You yourself do not have authority to approve a 
loan? 
A. Not of that size. 
O And as I understand it, there was no SBA 
16 j application that ever went before your boss? 
17 ; A. No committee action. 
18 I Q. No committee. Okay. And you weren't aware 
19 | of a specific date in which they presented this 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
material to you? 
A. It wasn't a high point. I don't know. It 
was in that rough time frame, late summer, early fall. 
Q. The reason I say that is paragraph 2.1 of the 
contract says, quote, buyer agrees to make application 
for a loan specified above within five calendar days, 
i Joel Rush - X 
i 
lj and defines that as the application date. You're not 
2 | able to say whether or not that was in fact completed? 
3' i A . I'm not. I know they were anxious- They did 
4 
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mention that they, you know., were under some time 
constraints, but I don't recall how long. 
Q. And in fact, on voir dire, as I elicited itf 
there was never a formal SBA application ever 
comple ted? 
A. There wouldn't have been from my side of this 
deal, although I would have prepared an application 
and a presentation once we got to that point. 
Q. And would that -- your testimony, as I 
understood it, is that you've never seen an SBA loan 
granted without that application? 
A• Very true . 
Q. In fact, the documents that you have show 
that even as of October 27th, 1993, and October 28th, 
1993, they were still providing you essential 
information with regards to the loan, is that correct? 
A. But that is typical, 
0. Just for the record, who was your boss at 
Bank of Utah? 
A. James C, Anderson. 
Q. And if I represented to you that I had a 
discussion with Mr. Anderson and he said that he was 
o «» •> c CH 
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i 
io ! 
11 
12 
13 
14 
absolutely unaware of any ?DO application being at 
Bank of Utah, that wouldn't surprise you., would it? 
A. No. He did not have any knowledge of 
discussing the property? 
Q . He didn't recall any. 
A. That's no reflection on his memory, it just 
was sometime ago. 
Q. When did you have possession of those 
documents, too? 
A. Excus e me ? 
Q. You say that you had possession of those 
documents until the PDQ people obtained it back. Do 
you recall whether that was? 
A. I have no recollection of a date. I just 
15 ! know that thev — there was some discussion about the 
16 | concern of not being able to buy the property. 
17 j Q
 # When ? 
18 A. T don't have a specific date. 
19 Q. Okay. I'm not trying to push you, but in 
20 1994 , even? 
21 A. It would have been -- I really don't know. 
22 It could have been f94. I honestly don't know when I 
23 redelivered the package to them. 
24 Q. Do you know of anybody who obtained title 
25 insurance, a title insurance preliminary report, for 
«~~ Q *a 
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y ou ? 
A. No. 
0. And you never ordered any? 
A. It would have been too premature. 
Q. Have you ever known a loan to be granted that 
is going to secure real estate without a preliminary 
title report? 
A. No. But it is premature. You incur a 
cancellation fee if you order it before you know 
you're going to do the deal. 
Q. Okay. You indicated that it might not be 
prudent to have the appraisal done without having 
certain environmental cleanup. The fact of the matter 
is that you can get the appraisal done without the 
environmental cleanup., can't you? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And if the parties to a contract like this 
have contractually agreed to make a loan application 
in five days, and as part of that loan application 
it's necessary to get an appraisal, then they've sort 
of locked themselves into that contract themselves? 
That's nothing the bank can do? 
MR. JONES: Objection. Argumentative. 
THE COURT: Counsel, I'll allow you to restate 
it. It seemed argumentative. If you want to, restate 
D -a r* e% d Q 
Joel Rush 
1 i t . 
2 MR. CHAMBERS: I appreicate that. 
3, Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) What I'm trying to get at 
4 ' is if the contract requires that an application be 
5 I made within five days, and that they progress to get 
6 ! that loan, that's nothing that -- the fact that they 
I 
7 j entered into a contract has absolutely nothing to do 
8 - with you as a bank officer? You still need that 
9 j appraisal to get the loan done? 
10 • A. Right, we need the appraisal. But typically 
11 j we don't spend the customer's money until we're pretty 
i 
12 j sure we're going to do the deal. 
13 | Q . I can appreciate that. And just to emphasize 
14 ! that, the appraisal is good for an entire year? 
15' A. (Witness nodded his head.) 
16 Q. Now. you started to say something but didn't 
17 j finish it and it was something to the effect that they 
18 1 were going to get an application. Do you recall that 
j 
19 J part of your testimony? 20
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
A. They were going to get an application? 
Q. Yes. T wrote it down rather quickly and I 
didn't get the context. 
A. I don't recall saying that, but an 
application in this case would — the formal 
application, as we talked about before, would be made 
«-~« 7 n 
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i 
1! to the CDC. who would be the driving entity in this 
i 
2 | type of a government guaranteed loan. My application 
j 
31 process, T believe, begins when we start talking and I 
4 ! express interest in the project and start accumulating 
j 
information. That's what I did with them. 
Q. Okay. I can appreciate that. But if the 
7 | contract defines the steps to which the parties have 
i 
8 | gone to, then they've contractually agreed to what the 
9! application process is, whether or not you have your 
i 
i 
10 I own definition? 
j 
11 | A. Sure . 
12 | Q. Let's talk about this just for a minute. The 
13 I contract does say buyer will have made application — 
14 "loan application only when buyer has completed, 
15 | signed and delivered to lender the initial loan 
16 | application and documentation required by the lender." 
j 
17 j That wasn't done, was it? Your testimony 8
19 
20 
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has been that there was nev r any ntent to pursue 
anything but an SBA loan? 
A . True. 
Q. And there were never any SBA formal 
applications submitted? 
A. The way it was represented to me is that the 
borrower — 
O. I'm sorry. Yes or no? 
D a rr o 7 1 
joei 5. u s n 
There was never an SBA amplication submitted 
to me 
Q . Yes. 
A. No . 
And none submitted to the -- vou called it 
the develoDment somethino? 
A. Thev referred them to me 
O. Did you, as a lender, at any time verify in 
writing that the buyer had been approved for the loan 
10 I as of — excuse .me iust one moment. (Pause.) As of 
i 
11 | November 21st, 1993? 
I 
1 2 ; A. would vou reoeat: the Question. 
13 
14 
O. I'd be happy to. The reason I'm hesitating 
is there's a Dhrase used in the contract called a 
15 ! verification date and I can't see where that defines 
16 I that. Usually it's in bold print, but it's not. What 
j 
17 | I asked was, did you as the lender verify in writing 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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24 
25 
that the buyer had been approved as of November 21st, 
1993? 
A . No. 
0. Did you verify in writing, prior to December 
15th, 1993 -- I would take it that at no time did you 
ever verify that they'd been approved for a loan? 
A. No. They were never presented to a committee 
for approval. May I suggest something relative to Jim 
D a n p 7 2 
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1 I Anderson, what you got from him. that would indicate 
he's aware of it? 
0 . T really wouldn't, if you don't mind. I 
apologize, but there's — 
A. Not a problem. 
0 . (Pause.) Did you note in the materials that 
were given you in the folder, Exhibit No. 2, that the 
tax returns that were submitted had different entities 
that were involved in there from time to time and 
those were partnerships between various individuals, 
including Mr. Hansen, Craig Hansen? 
A. Yes-
0. And that was part — that was explained to 
you adequately? 
A. Oh, yes. 
0. (Pause.) Were you, as a lender, on behalf of 
PDO, willing, on December 15th, 1993, to deliver to an 
escrow agent, or other party designated by the 
parties, loan proceeds in the approximate amount of 
592,750? Were you — okay. I appreciate that- Were 
you in a position to loan even one dollar on that 
date? 
A. That was certainly within my loan limits, but 
that was not the request. 
MR. CHAMBERS: Thank you. Nothing further. 
n -* *« « n ^  
Joel Rush - X 
1 : MR. JONES: Nothing further. 
2 ; THE COURT: You mav steo down. Counsel, let's go 
3! ahead and take maybe a ten minutes recess, whatever 
4 
5 
10 
11 
12 
you need, and you can advise the clerk, so that you 
can cross-reference, Mr. Chambers, your documents with 
what is in the actual Exhibit Mo. 2. I'll leave that 
sitting right here on the bench. Court will be in 
recess. 
MR. CHAMBERS: Thank you. Your Honor. 
(Shore recess.) 
THE COURT: Counsel, you've had an opportunity to 
go over Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 now. The motion is 
13! before the court for the admission of that exhibit. 
14! Is there an objection? 
15 MR. CHAMBERS: Mo. There was the one document 
16 i that was included that I've received a copy of now 
17 j Based on that I have no objection. 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
THE COURT: All right. Plaintiff's Exhibit 2 
will be received. Is there any objection to the 
witness being excused? 
MR. CHAMBERS: I do have a couple more questions 
based on what I've got. 
THE COURT: All right. Mr. Rush.. I'll ask you to 
come back to the witness stand. 
O. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) With regards to PDO Lube 
O o rr a 7 4 
•Joel Rush - X 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
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25 
lj Center., all the material that was sent to you 
2 I basically indicated PDO Lube Center, is that correct? 
i 
3 j If you would like to look at the exhibit. 
A. That is the name by which I knew the Ogden 
operation, yes. 
O . And did you understand them to be a 
corporation, a proprietorship? 
A. A partnership. 
O. A partnership? 
A. I believe it was a partnership return- Yes. 
the taxes are filed on a partnership return. 
Q. Okay. On the offer that was included in your 
package it has the buyer as PDQ Lube Center.. 
Incorporated. Did you have any knowledge you were 
dealing with a corporation? 
A. Umm, I did not pick that up. 
0. Had you known you were dealing with a 
corporation would you have asked for articles of 
incorporation? 
A. We would have had that before we signed 
documents. Yes. we would have gotten the corporate 
status from the state to see if they were filed. 
Q. What else would you have requested normally 
of a corporation? 
A. Corporate resolutions. On an SBA loan you 
D a r r o 7 R 
; Marr. in Collins - D 
i 
1 1 need to know who the ownership is. 
2 | 0. And if the corooration were susoended at that 
i 
3 | time, would you grant the loan to them? 
A. We would have — that happens regularly and 
we just tell them to -- we can't deal witfr them until 
they 've --
0. Reinstated? \v~ n~&^ 
A. Reinstated. '"" tf-'* A /(? \£A 
J**' r v ^ 1 
* Kr MR. CHAMBERS: Okay. Thank you. 
MR. JONES: Nothing further. 
THE COURT: You may step down. May this witness 
now be excused? 
MR. CHAMBERS y es 
14 I THE COURT: Thank vou . sir 
i 
15 1 MR. JONES: Call Martin Collins. 
MARTIN COLLINS, 
called as a witness, being first duly sworn to tell 
the truth, was examined and testified as follows: 
DIRECT EXAMINATION 
BY MR. JONES: 
0. Mr. Collins, please state your name. 
A. Martin Collins. 
Q • And where do you reside? 
A. Farr west, Utah. 
Q* And what is your association to PDO Lube 
« ~~« n£ 
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Craig Hansen - D 
of the testimony relative to documents requested and 
provi ded ? 
A. No. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object. That's like 
rubber stamping all of yesterday's proceedings. If 
there's a particular area he wants to address., he can 
testify to what his personal knowledge is, but I don't 
want to have him just verify everything that was said 
yesterday is true and correct. 
THE COURT: I'm going to allow the question and 
the answer. It is in essence a rubber stamp and I 
think that says a lot about how much weight the answer 
is going to carry, but on the on the other hand I 
don't think it's specifically objectionable. Go 
ahead . 
MR. JONES: Thank you. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Was an appraisal done on the 
propertyy 
Q. Why not? 
A. Umm, Mr. Rush indicated that the appraisal 
was preliminary. It was premature, I "guess," is the 
right word. 
Q. Why? In your mind was it premature? 
A. Well, it was premature at the initial 
Craig Hansen - D 
meeting, because there were Certain things that we 
2 1 needed t-o do L-o- y-o-tr know, qualify, show our intent to 
3 J proceed. 
4 Q. Did you do those things? 
5 A. Yes. 
6 £. After that, then, why wasn't an appraisaj 
7 obtained? 
8 A. In our opinion the seller wasn't proceeding 
9 forth with what we believed he was going to do as far 
10 as removing the tanks and presenting us a clean piece 
11 of property. 
12 Q. Were you concerned about the expense of an 
13 appra i sal? 
14 A. Yes. 
15 MR. fHAMBERS: I'm going to object as far as 
16 foundation what time frame we're even talking about. 
17 0. (BY MR. JONES) What did you understand an 
18 I appraisal to cost? 
19 A. Between three and four thousand dollars. 
20 Q. And were you willing to expend that appraisal 
21 without the tanks out of the ground? 
22 A. No. 
23 THE COURT: Counsel, I haven't yet sustained the 
24 objection. I'll allow you to lay a little more 
25 foundation on a time frame. I think that's an 
Craig Hansen - D 
appropriate request. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) And with respect to the time 
frame of this, when did you learn how much an 
appraisal would cost? 
MP. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object, so the record 
is very specific on this. T apologize. I'm not 
trying to interrupt your flow. 
MR. JONES: You -nean I had a flow? 
MR. CHAMBERS: He testified that Rush.indicated 
it was premature at the outset.
 H ,1 .understand the time 
frame for that, it's implied. But then he went on to 
say at another point that Mr. Huber was not proceeding 
in his opinion as he should. That's the objection I 
have, as to the foundation of when we're talking about 
there. 
THE COURT: All right. With that clarification, 
go ahead and lay—«wrre—fuuudd t-aro-ft-r-
*§. (BY MR. JONES) When did you seek out an 
appraisal? When did you look at having the property 
appra i s ed? 
A. Well, we looked to Mr. Rush for his direction 
on.that. The appraisal was part of the package that 
he needed to present to the SBA and so we -- I wasn't 
personally concerned because I was waiting for Mr. 
Rush's direction. 
Craig Hansen - D 
1 O. Okay. Did you personally talk to an 
2 appraiser^ 
3 A, Ye s. 
4 Q . When? 
5 A. Umm, I'd say -- T don't know exactly. If I 
6 had to give an opinion, I'd say tJie first paxt^jaf 
7 November 93• 
3 0. Okay. And at that point in time were you 
9 quoted a price as to what an appraisal would cost? 
10 A. The appraiser indicated it depended on the 
11 complexity of all the things he had to do, but 
12 somewhere in the neighborhood of three or four 
13 thousand dollars. 
14 O. And were you willing to expend three to four 
15 thousand dollars -- well, at this point in time did 
16 you have concern about the transaction being 
17 completed? 
13 A. Yes, sir. 
19 Q. The tanks weren't out of the ground? 
2 0 A. Wo. 
21 Q. Had you expected they'd be out of the ground 
22 by that point? 
23 A. Yes. 
24 Q. Why did you have that expectation? 
25 A. It was part of the contract. 
Craig Hansen - D 
Q. Had you been given any representation as to 
when the tanks would actually be out of the ground by 
3 I anyone ? 
4 A.- I believe -at t'he time the contract was signed 
5 that it - wa"$ — -it would be done right after thai:. I 
6 didn't know of anything that would prevent that from 
7 taking p!a:e. 
3 0. And you weren't willing to spend the three or 
S j four thousand dollars on the appraisal without the 
10 tanks out of the ground? 
11 A. Well, the appraiser said he wouldn't do the 
12 appraisal with the tanks in the ground. 
13 0. And did he offer any explanation? 
14 MR. CHAMBERS: I'm going to object as hearsay on 
15 that last part. 
16 THE COURT: I'll sustain that. 
17 Q. {BY MR. JONES) With respect to the $4,000 
18 check, you scnt that check to Marty Spicer when? 
19 A. 'Pause.) November 11th, I believe. I sent 
20 the check the ^ a m e day he asked me to ^ e n d it. 
21 Q . Let me back up for a second. With respect to 
22 the loan application, why wasn't a written loan 
23 application filed? I mean written, something filled 
24 out. Obviously there were documents that were 
25 provided and so on. Was there a written application. 
3 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
Lraig nansen - u 
I name, rank, serial number, that sort of thing, ever 
i filled out and filed with the bank or the S 3 A ? 
j A. Can you ask the question again? 
O. Yeah. Was there ever a written application 
ever filled out and filed? 
A . No . 
Q. Xtfhy? 
A. Mr. Rush indicated that there were several 
components -- several things we needed to do and 
present to him; and I believe he was the one that was 
going to do that, do the formal application package, 
the whole "thing, and present it to the SBA. 
O . Okay. This is very important, Craig. As to 
those things that you had to do that Mr. Rush 
instructed you to do. did you do all that you could 
16 ! do? 
IS 
19 
20 
I c S . 
O What, if anything, couldn't you do on that 
list of instructions from Mr. Rush? 
A. Nothing that I'm aware of. 
Q. What is it that held you up from getting to 
that point where you actually filled out the 
appli cati on? 
A. Ummf I think we indicated to Mr. Rush that 
the property wasn't being, you know, cleaned up like 
u r a J. g nans en - D 
we had thought it was <_, o i n g to be. He just told us 
that when that takes place, you know, please advise me 
so we can proceed, as I recall. 
Q. Did ycu understand that Marty Spicer was 
representing you in this transaction? 
A. Yes. 
Q . And also representing Lowell Kuber? 
A . Yes. 
Q- Did you ever have a personal conversation 
with Lowell Huber about this transaction? 
A. Yes, on one occasion, I believe. 
Q. Prior to or after September 22, 1993? 
A, After. 
Q. Long after? 
A. Yes. 
Q . (Pause.) In the cime f r a ;n e of entering into 
the contract, September 22, 1993, did you request a 
title report on the property? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you inspect the property? Have you been 
on the property? 
A. Yes. 
Q. When? 
A. Oh, September 17th and other occasions. 
Q. And subiect to the terms of the contract, you 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
17 
Craig Hansen - D 
accepted the property — is the property acceptable to 
you. subject to the terins of the contract? 
n. Y c S . 
0. 3o you've not rejected the property or found 
it to be unacceptable and notified Mr. Huber of that 
fact? 
>i . IM O . 
0. I note on the special contingencies that the 
first one was that the buyer obtain new financing. Do 
you recall that ? 
A. Yes. 
0. And also that reference is made to the 
addendum ., correct? 
> * rfes. 
0. Let's turn to the addendum. 
A. (Witness complied.) 
0. With respect to your obligations under the 
addendum, "buyer to provide a $4,000 nonrefundable 
cleanup deposit," was that done? 
A. Yes. November 11th, 1993. 
Q. Why was it not done until November 11th? 
A. I was never instructed to do so. 
Q. And when did you receive your first 
instruction to provide that deposit? 
A. November 11th, 1993. 
v. r a i u n a n s H n -
Q . And that instruction came ' O Tu 
2 J A. Mr. Spicer. 
3 0. And when, then, did you act on that 
4 I instruction? 
5 A. That same day, immediately. 
6 Q . You sent the check, which has been marked as 
7 Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 17? 
3 • A. Y e s . 
9 I 0. That was written on the ?DQ Lube Center 
1 0 a c c o u n t ? 
11} A. Yes. Tt looks like it's dated November 12th, 
12 not November 11th. I correct myself. 
13 0 . Your recollection is that you got a call from 
14 Mr. Spicer and mailed the check the same day? 
15 A. Yes. 
16 Q. Is that the same account as the thousand 
17 dollar earnest money check that was written on 
18 September 17th, 1993? 
19 A. Yes . 
2 0 Q. Are you aware that that check was not 
21 deposited into Mr. Spicer's trust account until a 
22 couple months ago or so? 
23 A . Yes. 
24 Q. Did you ask Mr. Spicer not to deposit that 
25 check into his trust account? 
Craig Hansen - D 
1 A. No. 
2 0. Did you have an expectation as to what would 
3 happen with that check? 
4 i A. I had no expectation. 
5! Q• Have there been sufficient funds in your 
6 1 account: to cover chat check since written? 
7 1* A. Yes . 
i 
8 1 O. Has it since been deposited into --
! 
9 | MR. CHAMBERS: I'll object as being irrelevant on 
j 
10 ! that last question. Either the check cleared and the 
i 
i 
11 J funds were somewhere by December 15th, 1993, or they 
i 
12 | were not. It's clear that they weren't. 
13 j THE COURT: I'm going to allow the answer. Go 
14 I ahead. 
15 ' Q. (BY MR. JONES) It provides in the addendum 
16 that you be responsible for all demolition and removal 
17 i and dump fees, is that correct? 
i 
! 
18 j A . Yes . 
19 | Q. Is there anything about that that you don't 
20 understand or don't agree with? 
21 I A. N o . 
22 Q. It provides that the offer be subject to 
23 approval of Logan City as to building site and 
24 construction permits* Were you aware of that 
25 provis ion? 
P a a p ?^8 
traig Hansen - A 
Exhibit No. 1? 
Yes 
17 
And please turn to the second page, paragraph 
A. (Witness complied.) 
Q. Read that for me, please. 
A, Number 17, attorney's fees: "In any action 
arising out of this contract, the prevailing pretty 
shall be entitled to costs and reasonable attorney 
fees . " 
Q. Is that what you're asking for from the court 
today? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Are you also asking the court to award you 
damages for lost profits as a result of not being able 
to close on the property on December 15, 1993? 
A. Yes. 
MR. JONES: (Pause.) Nothing further at this 
time. 
THE COURT: Cross-examination, We'll go about 15 
minutes. That's all we've got. ; / 
CROSS-EXAMINATION 
BY MR. CHAMBERS:
 < - ^ - ~ ^ 
Q. Mr. Hansen, you indicated at the outset that 
you were the president of PDQ Lube Center, Inc. 
«r*" 
x. 
-3 C Q 
Craig Hans en - X 
You're not the president of F D 0 Lube Center, Inc., are 
you ? 
A. I'm the president of PDQ Lube Service Center, 
4'}; Inc . 
Q . A small distinction, but nonetheless one that 
I think --
A. At the time, on the day of the contract, I 
3| was the president of PDQ Lube Center. 
9 1 Q. No, sir- On the day of the contract you were 
10 I the president of a suspended corporation that was not 
111 entitled to do business in the state of Utah. 
12 MR. JONES; Is that a question or a lecture? 
13 THE COURT: There needs to be a question, 
14 I counse 1 . 
15 Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS)" Did you find out that your 
16| corporation was suspended? 
17 1 A. Yes, I did. 
13 Q. And did your attorney tell you that the 
19 I effect of that suspension was that you were not 
2 0| entitled to do business in the state during that 
period of time? 
A. No. 
Q. Thank you. Now, Mr. Hansen, the law imputes 
to one who signs a contract that he understands what 
he's gone ahead and signed. Did you read Exhibit 1 
Craig Hansen - X 
when you signed it? 
A- No. 
0- So when you signed line 2 4 of this agreement, 
4 I and it says "this offer shall lapse and the brokerage 
5| shall return the earnest money if it's not accepted by 
6| six p.m., September 17th, 1993," you were not aware of 
what you'd signed? 
A . No . 
0. (Pause.) And your testimony is that contrary 
to what the document says, what addendum number one 
says on it, as Mr. Jones asked you twice, 
notwithsanding that it says it was dated 9/17 of '93, 
your testimony is that it was not signed on that date? 
A . Corre c t. 
Q. But you will concede, won't you. that what 
that says above your signature is that "all other 
terms of this agreement shall remain the same. Seller 
shall have until, blank, 9/17/93, to accept the terms 
specified above. Unless so accepted, the addendum 
shall lapse," that's what that says? 
A . 11 i s . 
Q. And so essentially you're in a position that 
if you don't want to go through with the contract, you 
can come back and tell this court T didn't intend to, 
the offer had lapsed? 
u i' a i a n a n sen - A 
MR. JONES* Objection, Your Honor. Calls for a 
conclusion„ 
3'I THE COURT: I'm going to allow him to answer, if 
4 he can, on a factual basis. If he's asking for a 
5 legal conclusion, I'm not going to allow that. If 
6 you're asking him if he thinks he could do that, I'll 
7 1 e t him answer. 
8 THE WITNESS: It was my intent to buy a piece of 
9 I property in Logan and operate a lube center. 
j 
10 I 0. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) Okay. And it was your 
11 intent to live up to the terms of the contract that 
12 you signed, right? 
13 A. Zes. 
14 Q. 9/23 of '93, September 23rd, '93, you 
r15| contacted the Certified Development Company, is that 
16 J your testimony? 
17 A. -Yes. 
18 J Q. You never completed and submitted a complete 
19| loan application with them, however? 
A. That's correct, 
2l| Q. And never completed and submitted a complete 
°2| loan application with the Bank of Utah? 
A. I did everything they asked me to do. 
2 4| 0. I don't doubt that, but you never submitted a 
25| complete loan amplication, right? You heard the 
ur a i a n a n s e n - A 
t e s t i m o n y of the b a n k e r y e s t e r d a y 
A . t c S . 
1 ! 
I 
2 J 
i 
3 | 0. Did the a p p r a i s e r e v e r tell you how lo n g it 
w o u l d take to c o m p l e t e the a p p r a i s a l ? 
A. I b e l i e v e lie said it w o u l d take a c o u p l e of 
w e e k s , o n c e he had a c l e a r c a l e n d a r to do i t . 
7 
S 
Q . O k a y . It s e e m s to me that r i g h t at the 
o u t s e t t h i n g s w e n t at a b i g b a n g p a c e . J u s t w i t h i n a 
9 I couple of days of sianing the documents you were down 
i 
10 I at the C D C , you w e r e at the b a n k e r , v o u ' d g o n e to 
11 I F e n n z o i l ; b u t a c c o r d i n g to y o u r t e s t i m o n y it w a s n ' t 
12 j until the first part of November until you contacted 
13 an a p p r a i s e r , is that c o r r e c t ? 
14 I A. Yes. 
15 i O. And we n e v e r did g e t an a p p r a i s a l of the 
j 
16 j property done, right? 
17 
IS 
19 
20 
21 
22 
A . That's correct. 
Q . Was it Mr, Huber's obligation to get this 
appra i s a 1? 
A. Ho. 
Q. Was it Mr 
apprai sal? 
A."" No. 
Q. Was it the CDC's obligation to get the 
apprai sal? 
Spicer's obligation to get the 
v - r a i a n a n s e n -
A . N O . 
O . I take it that it was your obligation to get 
3 1 the appraisal, right? 
4 I A. Tt was the bank's obligation, 
5| Q. The Bank of Utah? 
6 | A. Yes. They had to have the appraisal in the 
7 | package as they presented it to the CDC. 
0 . Okay. So if the bank d i d n' ? get the 
appraisal, that's their fault? They're your agent, 
10 right? It's not Mr. Kuber's --
11 | MR. JONES: Objection. Calls for a conclusion. 
12 0. (3Y MR. CHAMBERS) The bank is not Mr. 
13 Ruber's bank, right? 
14 THE COURT: I'll allow the question to proceed. 
15j You objected but I'm not sure which question. 
15 | MR. CHAMBERS: T assumed you were going to 
1 7 ; sustain it. 
18 THE COURT: He askc-d a compound question and I 
19 I wasn't sure. 
2 0 | MR. CHAMBERS: I assumed the court sustained it. 
That's why T moved on. T apologize. T didn't mean 
any disrespect. 
THE COURT: Go on. 
0. {BY MR. CHAMBERS) The bank is not Mr. 
Ruber's bank, right? 
C r a x g nansen *~ X 
A. I don't know where he bank's. 
0. But you Wcro
 L elying on the Bank of Utah to 
go ahead and get the appraisal? 
A. *J«-11, «> /vore ^ciki ug together and they — an 
appraisal was never ordered because the property was 
not *-„£ leaned . 
0. That's their decision, right? They can order 
the -ippraisal. Where in the contract does it say that 
the appraisal is only going to be obtained after the 
property is cleaned^ 
A. It doesn't say that. 
Q. And in fact, the contract says that you will 
make application with the bank within five days and we 
know that was not done. There was no formal 
appl1c a t i on. 
And u says in paragraph 2.2 that the 
p r o p d tv has •• o Lc qualified within SO days right? 
Paragraph 2.2. qualification: Buyer and the property, 
two separate, "buyer and the property must qualify for 
a loan, for which application has been made under 2.1, 
within 60 calendar days " which is defined as the 
qualification days, "after acceptance." 
Then it goes on and says "the property is 
deemed qualified if, on or before the qualification 
date, the property, in its current condition and for 
tr 3 i g idris^n -
the buyer's intended use. has appraised at a value not 
less than the total purchase price." That's --
MR. JONES: I'm going to object to the question 
and the line of questioning. The contract says what 
it says. I'm going to start having dreams about this 
contract, I've heard this provision so many times. 
Can't we just leave it at what it says? It seems to 
me that the questions are repetitive, irrelevant. 
THE COURT: Well, I'm going to allow you to ask 
your question, Mr. Chambers, but sonic of the questions 
are more in the nature of argument. Go ahead, ask 
your question. 
Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) Did you take steps to, 
within that SO day period, get an appraisal? 
MR. JONES: That question has been asked and 
answered two or three times from this witness and 
eight or ten times from other witnesses. 
THE COURT: I recall it from other witnesses. 
I'd have to look at my notes as far as this witness. 
I'll allow it. 
THE WITNESS: The appraisal couldn't be done with 
the tanks still in the ground. The appraisal was not 
ordered — 
0. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) That's according to what 
your appraiser says, sir? 
j C r a i g H a n s e n - X 
1 | THE COURT: Let him finish his question, or his 
i 
2 ) answer Jaafore you start. Go ahead, sir. 
3- THE WITNESS: Okay. The 3ank of Utah and the 
4 J a p p r a i s e r said they c o u l d n ' t do the a p p r a i s a l w i t h the. 
5 t a n k s T'ri the gr-oand^ 
6 O. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) Are you finished? 
7 A. Yes. 
S Q. Thank you. You heard Mr. Spicer's testimony 
9 I t h i s m o r n i n g that he got an a p p r a i s a l w i t h t a n k s in 
10 | the ground? 
11 | A. Yes. 
12 Q. Okay. And the contract itself contemplates 
13 that there's tanks in the ground? 
14 MR. JONES: Objection. Calls for a conclusion. 
15 I THE COURT: I'm going to allow the question. 
16 I We've all seen those provisions enough times that 
17 1 we're going blind. The contract obviously 
13 contemplated that there were already tanks in the 
19 ground. Go ahead. 
20 I Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) And there are no time 
21 frames specified for the removal of the tanks, are 
22 there? 
2 3 A. No. 
24 I Q. Notwithstanding your expectations, where in 
25 the contract does it say that they'd be removed within 
oj: sic nansiii 
the first: few days of that contract? 
A . It doesn't say that. 
0. (Pause.) So you were waiting on the 
4 | appraisal, per Rush's direction, right, is your 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
16 
<* *T 
X / 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
testimony this morning? 
A. Pardon me? 
Q. You were waiting on the appraisal per Rush's 
d irec t i on? 
A; Yes; 
Q. Had y o u p a i d t h e a p p r a i s e r a n y sum of money 
t o s t a r t t h e a p p r a i s a l ? 
A. ...No. 
Q• And in fact, you weren't willing to spend any 
money on an appraisal until the tanks were removed 
from the ground, that was your testimony this morning, 
right? 
<M . i e s . 
Q. And by that time you hadn't even paid the 
$4,000 deposit? We're at the time frame of the first 
part of November, when you went ahead and contacted 
the appraiser. You hadn't even performed fully on 
that part of the contract yet, had you? 
A. I mailed the check on the 12th of November. 
Q. That's right- And that was after you 
contacted the appraiser? 
Craig Hansen - X 
A. I'm not sure. 
Q . Okay. So you could have contacted the 
appraiser after you sent the check? 
A. I believe I contacted the appraiser the first 
part of November, but I don't have any documentation 
to support that. 
Q . I'm just trying to go along with your memory 
and test how solid it is. So as I understand it, you 
think it was before, but it could have been after is 
that what I'm hearing? 
A. I believe I contacted him the first of 
November. 
Q. And no question, when you were waiting on 
Rush to make the application. Rush was waiting on the 
property to get cleaned up? 
xx . i e s • 
Q. Isn't it true that the addendum to the 
contract contemplates that the total cleanup of the 
property is to be done 30 days -- it can be up to 30 
days past the closing? 
A. Which line? 
Q. The addendum item number four, "seller 
retains first right to match lowest demolition bid and 
complete bid project within 30 days after closing, 
weather permitting, reasonable delays." What my 
Craig Hansen - X 
question is, because I don't want to confuse youf is 
2 ! that the contract contemplates, for the cleanup, to 
3 
4 
5 
6 
7 
8 
9 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
occur even as late as 30 days after closing? 
A. (Pause.) I believe the demolition and the 
tank removal were two separate issues. 
Q. Okay. Even if you separate those two, and 
I'm not trying to trick you on that, even if you 
separate those two the contract does allow for Mr. 
Huber to perform 30 days after closing on the 
demolition? 
A• Okay. 
Q. We agree on that? 
A. Just what the contract says. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever make a written demand 
IB i upon Huber to remove the tanks prior to closing? 
16 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
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24 
25 
ZL- No. 
Q. Did you ever make an oral demand upon Mr. 
Huber to remove the tanks prior to closing? 
A. No. I was in conversation with Mr. Spicer 
over both of the last two questions you asked and 
there were problems. 
Q. Okay. Did you ever -- as I understand -it, 
you never did obtain the financing, correct? 
A. Financing could not be obtained until the 
tanks were taken out, that's correct. 
Paae 379 
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O. That's your understanding. But, sir. if 
someone else has a different interpretation of it 
that's what we're here for. 
You never did obtain the financing and so 
you couldn't have been in a position to close on 
December 15th? You didn't have the money to send i^ p 
here, right? 
MR. JONES: Objection. Argumentative. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I disagree wholly.. Your Honor. 
MR. JONES: Well, what he's saying is he couldn't 
have had the financing to do the project. I mean, 
what's that asking him? He could have had the 
financing if Mr. Huber had done what he was supposed 
to do . 
MR. CHAMBERS: I intend it to mean just the 
reverse. Did he have the funds available himself that 
he was able to close. 
THE COURT: Why don't you go ahead and just ask 
the question that way. 
Q. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) Did you have funds, 
independent of the bank, that you could have closed on 
December 15th? 
A. For the price of the property? 
Q. Yes. 
A. I didn't have that much in the bank, no. 
O a rra ^ 8 (J 
Craig Hansen - X 
Q. And so - - I'm not trying to belabor this, but 
the financing was key to this to be able to close? 
31 MR. JONES: Your Honor.. I'm going to object to 
4 that statement. It's pure and simple argument. 
5 MR. CHAMBERS: I'll restate the question. I'm 
6 not trying tjp. --
7 0. (BY MR. CHAMBERS) It was necessary for you 
8 to have the financing to be able to close on December 
"9 15th for the price stated? 
10 A. Yes. 
11 THE COURT: Counsel, we're about there as far as 
12 our time for this other hearing that has to be heard. 
13 MR. CHAMBERS: Your Honor, I do have some 
14 additional questions. I'd also like at this time to 
15 make a motion to dismiss the case. I think we've 
16 j heard enough evidence that the court can rule on the 
17 contract. 
18 THE COURT: Well, I'll allow you to renew that 
19 motion in the morning. I'm not going to take argument 
20 on it now because of the schedule we've got. 
21 MR. CHAMBERS: The reason I say that is that the 
22 court has some time possibly to think about this 
23 between now and tomorrow morning. I'm not so sure on 
24 these elements that the court is going to hear 
25 anything different from here on out. 
Addendum 6 
Testimony of Martin Collins, Owner PDQ 
Transcript pp. 92-96; 128 
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1 i A. Yes, we were quoted a price. 
2 J Q. And what was your understanding as to what 
i 
3-1 the appraisal would have cost you? 
4i A. He told us somewhere between 2500 and 4,000 
dollars. 
MR. CHAMBERS: I'd like to voir dire on that. 
THE COURT: Go ahead. 
8 | MR. CHAMBERS: Does your understanding come from 
9 I what Mr. Froerer told you? 
10 I THE WITNESS : Yes. 
11 j MR. CHAMBERS: Objection. Hearsay. 
12 MR. JONES: I suppose we can subpoena Mr. 
13 Froerer, but it seems to me that these guys were 
14 | trying to put a deal together. They've gone out and 
i 
15 j shopped for an appraiser. They're saying we haven't 
i 
16 | done our homework on this thing. They've gone out and 
! 
i 
17 j shopped for an appraiser, gotten quotes and so on. 
They can certainly say what they've done. 
THE COURT: I'll sustain the objection. I'm not 
sure it's that critical. It's clearly in the record ° 
18 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
that he contacted a qualified appraiser and found out to-
what it would cost. What the actual quote was I don't 
think is a critical fact in the case. 
MR. JONES: All right. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) With respect to the 
D a rr o Q 0. 
Martin Collins - D 
1 J appraisal, then, did you have occasion to gather 
! 
I 
2 I compa rabies? 
3 | A. we aid. 
0. And how did you do that? 
5| A. Umm . these were provided by Marty Spicer. if 
6| T recall. I think he just faxed them to us. I don't 
remember exactly. We called and told Marty what we 
8 i were up against and he said T can get those to you and 
i 
i 
9 ! he provided those to us within a couoirr of weeks. 
10 
11 
12 
13 
14 
15 
i 6 ; 
1 7 I 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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So you got comparables? 
We did. 
And you got those from who? 
Marty Spicer. 
And were those also forwarded to Bank of 
Utah? 
A . They were. 
Q . And did you forward them to an appraiser? 
A. No. T don't remember. I don't think so. 
£ - Did you go ahead with the appraisal with - — 
in the week or two of-entering into the real estate 
purchase contract?
 J \ j C OLA. 
A* JWo i we d i d n o t . 
0° to Q. Why not? 
A. Umm, we weren't getting any action on the 
side of the things that had to happen on the other 
Da rro 9 3 
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s'fae" of the transaction, "We were advised not to 
because~~~it might be a waste of monev. 
0_. *7it.h tesoect to — who advised vou? 
A. T b^liB.ve it -was the appraiser 
0. Okay. With respect to not getting action on 
the other side, what are you referring to? 
A. Umm r we had several conversations with Marty 
I over this time and he indicated to us that Lowell 
! 
I 
i 
!
 Huber was having second thoughts and didn't want to go 
through with t he Transaction lOAe^^A^eO^ 
MR. CHAMBERS: Your Honor T apologize. T don\t 
know what the proper objection is. but it's essentia 
for Pie to have a good cross-examination and to know 
what rime frame we're talking about. I know T ca 
clear it up on cross. 
THE COURT: Let's have you lay some further 
foundation. I think the answer itself is a cLm i s s i b 1 e 
but it probably does require more foundation 
ahead. 
0. (BY MR. JONES) You were there /when the 
addenda was written up? 
A. I wa s . 
0. And do you recall one of the provisions 
relative to environmental clearance? 
A. I do• 
"D a rt ex Q A 
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1 ; 
2 i 
Q. Was that a concern to you? 
A. Absolutely. 
Q. Whv? 
A. ^-Because I've got a good friend in California 
w h o/b ought a piece of property for $200,000 and sp eVi t 
00,00 0 cleanina it up. That would have killed the/ 
7 i Weal. We wouldn't have done the deal under siitiLi'ar 
fhat was vour understandina of — well 
10 
11 I 
12 
13 
14 
15 
I 
i 
16 ! 
1 7 I 
strike that. 
With respect to the looseleaf, where has 
that looseleaf been over the last -- since it was 
given to Joel Rush at Bank of Utah, to your knowledge? 
A- Once we gave it to Joel, because of the time 
frame, we gave him the original. Several times we'd 
take it back for a day or two to make copies. Then 
Joel left the Bank of Utah and left it at the Bank of 
18 i Utah. Upon thinas needina to be oreoared for this 
19 
20 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
case, I've been in contact with Joel to make sure that 
we were still — he was still interested in doing the 
dealf but the package was left at the Bank of Utah. I 
went and got it the latter part of last year. 
Q. So you actually got it from Bank of Utah? 
A. I did. 
Q. When? 
Pane 95 
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Umm, probably November of fS4. 
And what did you do with it at that point? 
Sent it to you. 
By Federal Express? /£e^># ^-^ 
Overnight. 
Do you still want this property? 
Absolutely. 
You want to complete this transaction and 
i 
i 
9 ' build a lube center? 
i 
A. Yes
 f sir. 
0. (Pause.) Did you ever fill out an SBA loan 
applicacion ? 
A. No. 
0. Itfhy not? 
1 ! A 
2
 ; Q 
3 : A 
4 j 0 
5 I A 
6 I Q 
7 A 
B I 0 
MR. CHAMBERS: Objection. /Relevance. The fact 
that the contract calls for it/doesn't ask why it 
wasn ' t done . 
THE COURT: 1*11 allow the question. 
TBY MR:—roifrE-S-)—.-Jghx-iiuL? 
A. Because of the stalls, the skids, that werl 
put on it by Lowell Huber 
JES: (Pause.) Nothin 
time . 
THE COURT: Cross-examination 
Darro Q A 
i-iarcn; •,. u i ± i n : 
II buyer has completed, signed and delivered to the 
2 ! lender the initial loan application and documentation 
3! required by the lender and paid all loan application 
4 ! fees as required by the lender." 
Now. you were aware that you were going to 
need an appraisal on that property, correct? 
A. Umm, probably so. 
m a 
0. And in fact, you hadn't even sent up the 
check for $4,000 that was required by the addendum 
16 I until November 12th, isn't that correct? 
i / 
18 
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A. Umm, I didn't send the check, but I think 
that's what the record shows. 
0. Okay, Can you represent to this court that 
during this time frame when you felt you were not 
getting any cooperation, that the check had been sent 
at least? 
A. I didn't send the check, so I can't represent 
when the check was sent.- '• 
Q. So whether or not you felt like you were 
Parrp 12 8 
Addendum 7 
Testimony Martin Spicer, Real Estate Agent 
Transcript pp. 157-158, 166 and 173-176 
i-i arc x n ^ p ]. c a r — u 
1 ; A. I spoke with a Mr. Rush regarding the 
2 , property. They. I believe., at the time were there 
3 ! with Mr. Rush speaking with him about this property 
i 
4 | and were starting the process of application. 
5 
6 
Q . Do you know approximately when that 
conversation occurred? u>L 
i i 
£ f O -
A . I believe that happened within one or two 
8 ! days of acceptance of the offer. I would say it wai 
9 i on the 22rd , T4th 
10 | Q . I'll hand you what Is ra arked F lain tiff's 
Exhibit No. 8 and ask you what that is a copy of? 
A. That is indicatina Joel Rush as the lender. 
L J. 
i ^ 
13 
14 
i 
15 ! 
16 I 
17 ; 
i 
1 8 I 
19 
20 
21 
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Also Craig's phone number. Just some notes that I had 
taken down during that phone conversation, which I put 
in my file, to contact Mr. Rush regarding the 
transaction as it progressed. A-/'" ^//'^^ 
Q. Did you assist FDQ in assembling any 
comparables or any other information relative to the 
property or how it may — as to the value of the 
property? Anything else to do with the project? 
A. I was asked, in that phone conversation with 
Craig and Mr. Rush, that comparables regarding -- that 
financing from their perspective looked good, feat -we 
needed to order an appraiser and could I help to 
" * • _ • _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ _ - - • • ' 
provide their appraiser, who would be coming out in 
T> a a a 1 5 7 
nartin ^ o i c o r - u 
1 the next week or so. with comparable sales. I 
2 indicated that I could. I collected and com piled that 
3 information and then faxed off those documents. 
4 i Q. And I'll hand you what is marked as 
5 | Plaintiff's Exhibit No. 9. I'll ask you what that is? 
6 | A. This is a cover sheet for our fax machine 
7 J. when we send out documents that identifies who this 
S ! was being sent to. It shows that it was being faxed 
5 to Marty. Marty Collins, and at his fax number, or a 
10 I fax number. 731-SSC5. It was from me. These were the 
1 1 ; cornps tha t I did send ou t . 
i 
12 j Q . Let me show you what has been marked as 
Defendant's Exhibit -- if I can have the looseleaf for 
14 | a second* 
I 
15 | THE COURT: Is this a witness? Mr. Chambers, is 
16 this a witness? 
1 7 ! MR. CHAMBERS: T don't think so. 
i 
13 I THE WITNESS: I need to make a correction. 
I 
19 | Q. (BY MR. JONES) If T mav. Mr. Spicer, this is 
I 
20 i a microphone. The way that the court keeps a record 
21 
22 
23 
24 
25 
of this case is by video. So you need to — before 
the clerk tells you, we need to have you keep any 
papers away from the microphone itself. 
A. Okay. Thank you. 
Q. Go ahead. You were about to make a 
Parrp 15 8 
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percent to the listing agency, three percent to the 
selling agency. If it is a complicated transaction 
3! that may involve tax exchanges, environmental issues, 
4 other issues, as in this case, with an eight percei 
7 
10 
fee, five percent goes to the listing agency and three 
ppr r Pn f goe&-
14 
15 
i 6 : 
17 
18 
19 
20 
21 
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25 
:e s~eTling agency. / 
Q. On paragraph seven I note — I'm sorry* 
Let's go back to paragraph five. "Buyer and seller 
confirm that prior to signing this contract written 
disclosure of agency relationship was provided to himj 
or her," and then neither of the boxes there are 
checked. Do you see where I'm talking about? 
T do • 
Do you recall why the boxes weren't checked 
A. I do not recall why they are not checke 
C. Let's go back to when this transaction was 
occurring. You indicated your recollection was 
September 17th, 1993. PDQ was in your office, 
vis-a-vis Craig Hansen and Marty Collins, correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. Was Lowell Huber also in your office? 
A• He did come to my office later that evening 
to review the first offer and to write up a 
counterof fer. 
Paae 166 
that? 
Martin Spicer 
That's Lowell Huber's 
O. (Pause.) Now, you've already testified that 
to your knowledge the tanks have not been removed from 
this property. Do you have any sense as to why they 
have not been removed? 
MR. CHAMBERS: I would object. Foundation. 
MR. JONES: I can ask if he has a sense first. 
THE COURT: I guess he can answer that one. I'm 
not sure it will get us anywhere, but go ahead. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Do you have a sense as to why 
they've not been removed? ^f^lC^e^^^ 
A. Mr. Huber was --
THE COURT: No. It's a yes or no question. 
0. (BY MR. JONES) A yes or no question. 
A. Yes. 
O. Okay. And would that sense be based on 
conversations you had with Lowell Huber? 
A. Yes. 
Q. And when did those conversations occur? 
A. Umi, during the process of -- after 
t^r-.o^ : 
accejpXaj^ce of t h e i n i t i a l o f f e r , i n t r y i n g to cj^ose 
t h i s t r a n s a c t i o n and t h r o u nJvni f, t h 9—^^n s^rrtij? n , 
o *>** *± 1 n 1 
Martin Spicer - D 
Q. And let's -- do you recall the first 
conversation, after the real estate purchase contract 
was entered into, with Mr. Huber about tank removal? 
-Mr-:—HgEer was ija_ a _p^osJ.xLa.0 &ILCL-W as^pxe pa r i n g 
tx) remove - - l<T- <H:rt, iH 
MR. CHAMBERS: Objection. Nonresponsive. The 
question was does he recall it. We need more 
foundation as to where, when, who. 
THE COURT: Restate the question, please. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Let's go to -- well, let's 
approach this a little bit differently. Let's go to 
the time of the transaction. The first paragraph 
provides for the removal of unacceptable contamination 
at seller's expense. Do you recall that language? 
A . I d o . 
Q. Okay. The second provision, provision number 
two, the buyer to provide a $4,000 nonrefundable 
cleanup deposit, forfeited if buyer does not complete 
transaction, credited to reduce the purchase price 
upon completing transaction. Do you remember that 
language? 
A. I do. 
Q. In fact, reading quickly through the rest of 
this, there are ten items and nearly all of those 
items refer to clean up of the property in one way or 
Paap 174 
Martin Spicer - D 
another, do they not? in€A>^€^r^s**^ 
Q. And there is some language in here about a 
1031 Exchange for Mr, Huber ' s benefit, is that 
correct? 
A. That's correct. 
Q. So removal of those tanks was clearly part of 
this transaction? 
r~ Yes. i t was 
Q. And according to this -- well., this addendum 
provides that Mr. Huber was to remove those tanks and 
provide environmental clearance, does it not? 
A. Yes, it does. 
Q. (Pause.) Was it your understanding, at the 
timethat the transaction was entered into, that that 
would be done? 
A. Yes, i t was 
t2. When? 
A*. Prior to closing 
TJ *, ~^ 1 T K 
Martin 
i | 
2 I 
3-1 
4 i 
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Correct 
Q . Okay. Did you have any reason to belijeve 
thdt Mr. Huber understood that it wasn't his 
obligation to remove the tanks? 
A. No, I did not. 
Q. Did he acknowledge his obligation to remove 
if-n-H* 
the tanks to you? 
A. He did. 
Q. And did he ever tell you why he didn't do it? 
A. He told me of a separate agreement that he 
had --
MR. CHAMBERS: Objection- Foundation. 
Q. (BY MR. JONES) Okay. When did this 
conversation occur? 
A. This conversatiojp^^fccnrred Tnwoerous times 
Initially it happened/on April 15th, 1991, wiien the --
a listing was written andw^~ listed the property for 
$140,000. In the remarks, tanks, ten years old. 
Owner will remove at his expense prior to -- as per 
sale agreement with Dick Bowen, prior owner. That 
discussion went on numerous times after that, due to 
Mr. Huber having negotiated that with Brent Hoggan of 
Olson and Hoggan and the Bowens. That was the 
information I was given. 
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